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Abstract 
  
This study investigates the changes in the operating performance of public-to-private leveraged 
buyouts (LBOs) backed by one or more private equity firms. For this purpose, this dissertation 
focuses on a sample of 65 completed public-to-private LBOs in the United Kingdom, which 
were finalised between 2003 and 2015, and exited by 2018. Specifically, the changes in 
operating performance in terms of EBITDA/sales, EBIT/sales and EBITDA/total assets, as 
measured directly and relative to the industry median, before the LBO and at exit by the equity 
provider, is analysed. A regression methodology from the literature is used to determine the 
impact of various transaction and company-specific attributes on operating performance 
changes, based on the shareholder-related agency costs and free cash flow/benefits of debt 
theories. Surprisingly, the overall picture indicates a negative operating performance change of 
going-private LBOs in the post-buyout period. The main factors explaining the changes in 
operating performance seem to be changes in leverage. On the other hand, the hypotheses 
relating to improved management incentives and improved shareholder monitoring are not 
supported by the results, as these factors seem to have little to no effect on the operating 
performance changes related to the public-to-private LBOs in the sample.      
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1. Introduction  
 
This dissertation investigates the changes in the operating performance of public-to-private 
leveraged buyouts in the United Kingdom that were executed from 2003 to 2015 and exited by 
2018. Specifically, this dissertation aims to identify sources of operating performance changes 
in public-to-private LBOs mainly from the perspective of shareholder-related agency costs and 
free cash flow/benefits of debt theories.   
The present chapter will provide a detailed overview of the investigated topic, including the 
theoretical and conceptual framework used, along with the hypotheses to be tested in this study. 
This chapter will also present a brief history of leveraged buyouts and the current state of the 
LBO market in the UK, the US and major European countries. In an effort to clarify why there 
is a need for this particular study in academia, this chapter will lastly provide the main 
motivations for conducting this study.   
1.1. Background of Research  
 
Definition of a Leveraged Buyout 
According to Kaplan and Strömberg (2009), “in a leveraged buyout, a company is acquired by 
a specialised investment firm using a relatively small portion of equity and a relatively large 
portion of outside debt financing. The leveraged buyout investment firms today refer to 
themselves (and, are generally referred to) as private equity. In a typical leveraged buyout 
transaction, the private equity firm buys majority control of an existing mature firm”.  
 
In other words, unlike a merger, a leveraged buyout (“LBO”) does not involve the combination 
of two distinct or similar firms in order to establish a consolidated new business, in the form of 
a new company or joint venture. In a leveraged buyout transaction, the equity shares of a public 
or non-public corporation is acquired by a non-strategic acquirer, typically including a group 
of private investors, a private equity company/companies or management. The typical LBO 
deal is financed by using a significant portion of debt, borrowed against the assets and/or cash 
flows of an acquired company (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009).   
 
An LBO transaction is not only limited to public-to-private deals in which public shareholders 
are bought out, and the target is taken private after a delisting process from the relevant stock 
exchange. It may also include private and smaller businesses that undergo a similarly structured 
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deal, using a large portion of debt, which goes beyond the industry average. However, in the 
present study, the focus will be on private equity-backed public-to-private (“PTP”) LBOs, 
specifically deals that were completed in the United Kingdom between 2003 and 2015, and 
exited by 2018. 
Definition of private equity firms, private equity funds and transactions  
 
Gilligan and Wright (2008) offer a very detailed definition of a private equity firm: “Private 
equity is risk capital provided in a wide variety of situations, ranging from finance provided to 
business start-ups to the purchase of large, mature quoted companies, and everything in 
between. Buy-outs are examples of private equity investments in which investors and a 
management team pool their own money, usually together with borrowed money, to buy a 
business from its current owners.”  
Private equity funds typically have a time horizon usually spanning from 10 to 13 years. In 
other words, the private equity firm usually has well-defined investment horizon. In fact, 
according to Kaplan and Strömberg (2009), the private equity firm has “typically up to five 
years to invest the capital committed to the fund into companies”.  
It should be noted that this dissertation focuses on public-to-private LBO transactions where a 
private equity firm takes a listed company private. In this regard, according to Kaplan (1989a), 
a private equity transaction involving a public company is a transaction where a private equity 
firm takes a public company private by paying a premium of 15 to 50% on top of its stock price. 
The transaction (or leveraged buyout) is generally financed with 60-90% debt provided by 
banks (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009).  
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Adapted from Gilligan and Wright (2008), the following is a diagram depicting different parties 
in a typical private equity LBO transaction.  
Figure 1:  Parties Involved in a Private equity Transaction defined as an LBO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Adapted from Gilligan and Wright, who authored “Private Equity Demystified. An Explanatory Guide”, Second 
Edition, 2008. 
 
History of Leveraged Buyouts 
 
The rise of leveraged buyouts (LBOs) started over thirty years ago in the United States and 
lasted for over a decade. In fact, LBOs became a major instrument that characterised the hostile 
takeovers that emerged, especially in the United States, starting from the 1980s. Perhaps one of 
the most well-known public-to-private LBO transactions that took place in this era is the 
acquisition of RJR Nabisco by Kohlberg Kravis Robert & Co for US$ 31 billion (or US$ 55 
billion when adjusted to inflation) in 1989.  
 
Ever since LBOs first appeared in the 1980s, the value creation in LBOs has been a focal point 
of research in academia, considering the fact that the annual value of LBOs of U.S. publicly 
listed companies increased from US$33 million to US$224 million between 1980 and 1987 
(Liebeskind, Wiersema and Hansen, 1992). In fact, a number of well-known academic 
researchers, such as Jensen (1989), predicted the “eclipse of the public corporation” due to its 
inherent short-comings, which would ultimately result in the rise of the private company. 
According to Jensen (1989), different corporate structures, including “takeovers, corporate 
breakups, divisional spinoffs, leveraged buyouts and going private transactions”, were a 
representation of this new organisational innovation in the markets. According to Jensen 
Private equity  
Banks Target Company  
Shareholders 
Management 
Employees 
Suppliers 
Customers  
NewCo  
(Acquisition Vehicle) 
Negotiations 
Negotiations 
Negotiations 
Capital 
Capital 
Debt Transaction  
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(1989), these organisational forms used “public or private debt”, instead of “public equity”. 
This way, these corporate structures seemed to improve their “operational efficiency, employee 
productivity and shareholder value” after “resolving the central weakness of the public 
corporation - the conflict between owners and managers over the control and use of corporate 
resources – (…)” (Jensen, 1989). However, the collapse in the US stock and high yield bond 
markets in the early 1990s caused a significant decline in the number of LBOs during this 
period, as documented by Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) and Jensen (1991).   
 
The second wave of leveraged buyouts started in the early 2000s and reached an all-time peak 
in 2007. In fact, LBOs completed during the second wave were far larger in terms of value than 
LBOs during the first wave of the 1980s. Thus, Shivdasani and Wang (2011) find that the value 
of LBOs completed between 2004 and 2007 reached US$535 million, more than the double of 
the US$225-million-value in the first LBO wave.  The second LBO wave involved middle-
sized firm in new industries with growing prospects, whereas the LBOs in the first wave were 
large companies in mature industries. What makes the second LBO wave even more interesting 
was the transaction type, specifically that public-to-private (PTP) transactions had a greater 
share in total transaction value. In the early 1990s, PTP LBOs made up 9% of deal values 
compared to 34% in the second wave of the 2000s (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009).     
 
The rise of the second LBO wave was triggered by the exponential growth of debt and securities 
markets in the early 2000s. This trend facilitated the financing of riskier capital structures, as 
the economic environment at that time offered very favourable credit conditions, most notably 
low interest rates. However, the number of completed LBOs saw a sharp decline after the 
subprime meltdown of 2007, raising concerns on the value creation mechanisms of the LBOs. 
In fact, after the collapse of the collateralized debt obligation (CDO) market, the number and 
volume of LBO transactions shrunk by 94% (Shivdasani and Wang, 2009).  
 
To illustrate the evolution of public-to-private LBOs during the second wave, the acquisition 
of Energy Future Holdings, an electric utility company from the United States, by a consortium 
led by Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co, Texas Pacific Group (TPG Capital) and Goldman Sachs 
for US$48 billion in 2007 was by far the largest public-to-private LBO completed at the height 
of mega-buyouts between 2005 and 2007. Left with a debt of US$ 40 billion after the buyout, 
Energy Future Holdings filed for bankruptcy in 2014. The entire deal was the result of a gamble 
by large private equity firms that the energy prices would rise and Energy Future Holdings 
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would dominate the energy market. A few years after the global financial crisis, however, the 
credit markets recovered and favourable conditions were restored in the second half of the 
2010s, leading to an increase in the number of LBOs completed since then. The risky LBO 
structures as led previously by large private equity firms have become less common. In this 
regard, the acquisition of PetSmart Inc by the UK-based BC Partners for US$9 billion in 2014 
is amongst largest LBO deals completed since 2007.   
 
The table below provides an overview of LBOs and strategic transactions from 2013 to 
November 2018 completed in the US and developed European countries, including the UK, 
Germany, Switzerland, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands and France. For ease of reference, 
according to Tables 1 and 2, strategic LBO transactions involve a strategic acquirer that buys 
into a target company that is in direct competition or operates in an adjacent industry, such that 
this target company would fit the core business of the acquiring company.  On the other hand, 
the tables below define an LBO as a public-to-private LBO transaction of a target firm backed 
by one or more private equity firm.  
   
Table 1: Numerical distribution of LBOs by year and transaction type in the US and 
Developed European Countries1 
Transaction Type 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Jan – Nov 2018 
LBO 1 851 2 411 2 410 2 250 2 135 1 889 
Strategic LBO 21 043 28 543 29 641 27 170 25 078 21 458 
Grand Total  22 894 30 954 32 051 29 420 27 213 23 357 
1 the UK, Germany, Switzerland, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, and France 
Source : Capital IQ 
 
Table 2: Transaction value (US$ mn) of LBOs by year and transaction type in US and 
Developed European Countries1 
Transaction 
Type 
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Jan – Nov 
2018 
LBO 171 726 168 258 165 771 131 616 103 452 91 011 
Strategic LBO 1 073 529 1 918 840 2 476 342 2 121 976 1 630 657 1 254 409 
Grand Total  1 245 256 2 087 098 2 642 113 2 253 593 1 734 109 1 345 420 
1 the UK, Germany, Switzerland, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, and France 
Source : Capital IQ  
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LBO trends in the US, the UK and Continental Europe 
 
In fact, since the 1980s LBO wave, public-to-private LBOs have been among most prominent 
transaction types, which significantly contributed to the incremental growth of the PE industry 
globally. No doubt, private equity and leveraged buy-outs play a key role today in most 
developed capital markets worldwide. Accordingly, the LBO and private equity phenomena 
continue to receive significant attention in academia.  
 
As seen in the following tables, the US is by far the most active LBO market worldwide in 
terms of transaction number and size. Despite being the second largest LBO market, the UK 
market barely generates a quarter of the transaction volume of the US market.  When it comes 
to continental Europe, Germany, France, Spain, Italy and the Netherlands occupy the most 
prominent positions in terms of transaction count and size over the last few years, spanning 
from 2013 through to 2018.  
 
Table 3: Breakdown of LBOs by country  
Transaction 
Type 
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Jan – Nov 
2018 
Switzerland 299 377 383 445 419 345 
Italy 403 604 657 801 861 740 
Netherlands 500 547 670 679 610 564 
Spain 969 1 433 1 488 1 417 1 299 1 157 
France  1 460 2 026 2 022 2 048 2 374 1 724 
Germany 1 701 2 422 2 433 2 300 2 390 1 920 
United Kingdom 3 495 4 538 4 921 4 380 3 903 3 406 
United States 14 067 19 007 19 477 17 350 15 357 13 501 
Grand Total  22 894 30 894 32 051 29 420 27 213 23 357 
Source: Capital IQ 
 
Despite some ups and downs, the number and volume of LBO transactions, including PTPs or 
MBOs, have been slowly increasing, in particular, in less risky and mature markets, which 
include Western European countries. 
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Table 4: Transaction size of LBOs by country (US$ mm) 
Transaction 
Type 
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Jan – Nov 
2018 
Switzerland 8 304 59 167 23 086 65 497 43 931 6 340 
Spain 27 301 69 475 37 698 53 761 77 530 43 099 
Italy 32 462 33 371 37 884 41 183 42 853 41 544 
France 37 711 154 246 89 456 58 390 85 492 35 555 
Netherlands  39 345 51 915 35 274 36 393 80 890 55 900 
Germany 81 306 91 495 89 715 62 190 85 872 37 128 
United Kingdom 113 588 220 227 468 100 182 270 205 021 196 025 
United States 905 236 1 407 198 1 860 896 1 753 906 1 162 518 929 826 
Grand Total  1 245 256 2 087 098 2 642 113 2 253 593 1 734 109 1 345 420 
Source: Capital IQ 
1.2. Purpose of Study and Problem Statement  
 
The main aim of this study is to investigate the ability of private equity funds to create value 
by taking public corporations private through LBOs. This is a simplified definition of the 
Public-to-Private Leveraged Buy-Out. In this regard, the operating performance of target LBO 
firms in the post-buyout period is examined.  This dissertation concentrates on private equity-
backed PTP LBOs that took place from 2003 to 2018 in the United Kingdom, and includes both 
PE-backed LBOs and PE-backed LBOs involving the company’s existing management (i.e. 
PE-backed public-to-private MBOs/LBOs).   
 
According to some academics, private equity is a “superior form of organisation”, as discussed 
by Kaplan and Strömberg (2009). This thinking entails that LBOs are a source of value creation 
for target companies, including most of the time, public corporations that have reached a certain 
degree of maturity. Most research papers and studies published in this field describe PE-backed 
LBOs as a positive contributor to the subsequent operational performance of target companies. 
Studies also indicate that improved operating performance result in higher returns for different 
stakeholders (including investors and debt providers) on their investment in LBOs.  
 
Operating performance is usually measured as the change () in sales (Bull, 1989; Muscarella 
and Vetsuypens, 1990), income (Kaplan, 1989a) or cash flow (Bull, 1989; Opler, 1992). In 
addition, some scholars study improved operating performance as a function of higher rate of 
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productivity (Liechtenberg and Siegel, 1989) or lower range of capital expenditures (Kaplan, 
1989a), which stem from an improved strategic focus and restructuring after an LBO structure 
is formed.    
 
Most of the researchers in this area conclude that the improved operational efficiency of target 
companies going private under an LBO structure is a direct result of improved management 
incentives, reduced agency costs, improved governance and increased operational expertise. 
For instance, Jensen (1986 and 1989) asserts that private equity firms improve firm operations 
and create value by applying financial, governance and operational engineering and promoting 
governance principles in corporate practices.    
 
Considering the above theoretical framework with regard to the value creation dynamics of 
LBOs, the focus of this present research is to investigate sources of value in the operational 
performance of the target companies from the perspective of the agency cost and free cash flow 
theories. In other words, this dissertation has a more focused approach, by examining only the 
change in operating performance on the firm level. Thus, value creation, financial returns and 
wealth transfers from the point of view of different stakeholders (e.g. shareholders, debt 
providers) are omitted from the scope of this dissertation.  
 
Most importantly, this research aims to complete the lack of data and study with regard to PTP 
LBOs that happened during the second and third wave of LBOs in a specific geography, i.e. the 
UK, specifically given that most of the relevant studies focussed on LBOs that happened in 
earlier periods. For instance, Kaplan (1989a) analyses 76 management buyouts that took place 
from 1980 to 1986 in the US, and the research carried out by Guo at al. (2011) examine 192 
PTP LBOs completed between 1990 and 2006, again in the US.  
 
To sum up, the logic behind the time window selected to conduct this study can be explained 
by the general impact of the financial crisis in 2007-2008 upon global debt and stock markets. 
For this reason, this dissertation examines PTP LBOs that were announced starting from 2003 
(i.e. approximately five years before the global financial crisis) and exited by 2018. In other 
words, 2018 is the final year during which an LBO must reach a final outcome (e.g. IPO, SBO, 
strategic investor sale, insolvency) in order to be included in the sample collected for this study.  
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It should also be noted that the period from 2003 to 2007-2008 is seen as the second wave of 
LBOs, as it is characterised by a boom phase in LBO transactions completed in terms of value 
and volume.  As the markets recovered from the financial crisis of 2007-2008, another wave of 
LBOs seems to have started in the 2010s, even though it still is in its infancy and far from 
reaching the same levels of dynamism recorded during the second wave of early 2000s. 
Therefore, the timespan of this present study is relevant to understand the current dynamics that 
have been affecting the LBO market since 2003.  
 
When it comes to geographic scope of this dissertation, the UK market is considered one of the 
most suitable countries in which to carry out this type of research, as it has always been the 
second largest LBO market worldwide after the US, and it was also one of the economies most 
affected by the financial crisis of 2007-2008. This research, therefore, aims to test the current 
thinking in academia with regard to sources of value in LBOs before and after the global 
financial crisis.  
 
A further key reason for selecting the UK as LBO study market can be explained by data 
availability. The UK is unique in the sense that all companies registered within it, be it public 
or private, are required to submit their audited financials to Companies House, a public register 
where anyone can access and download online financial reports of companies. On the other 
hand, when it comes to the US market, most studies focus on reverse leveraged-buyouts where 
companies go public again after a period of private ownership. Authors of the US-based studies 
collect data on companies by accessing their corporate tax returns (e.g. Cohn et al., 2014), and 
SEC filings, if the target firm issues publicly held debt or is acquired later by another public 
company (e.g. Kaplan, 1989a). Data availability is also a major challenge for other countries, 
including South Africa. Therefore, this dissertation focuses on the UK LBO market, as public 
data on private companies is relatively more available for this market.      
 
Last but not least, limiting the research to one single country eliminates complexities introduced 
by diverse legislative frameworks of different countries, as well as other country-based 
discrepancies and differences relating to financial market maturity, regulations and 
macroeconomic structures.  
 
In terms of search strategy, several public resources and databases were used to access the 
relevant information of parties involved in an LBO transaction completed in the UK. In order 
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to facilitate the deal search, the following keywords were used: public-to-private leveraged 
buyout, management buyout, Private Equity, United Kingdom. The databases queried include 
Companies House UK, S&P Capital IQ, MergerMarket and many others. The search strategy 
will be presented in detail in Chapter 3.   
 
1.3. Hypotheses Development 
 
The following are the detailed hypotheses, based on the findings in the related finance literature 
and the research sample that are tested in this study:  
Hypothesis 1: Changes in operating performance of PTP LBO target firms are positively 
correlated with reduced agency costs (e.g. improved management incentives) (H1) 
Kaplan (1989a) and Guo et al. (2011) find a positive and significant improvement in net cash 
flows after an LBO deal. One of the reasons given in both research studies is related to reduced 
principal-agent costs, especially in deals involving the management of the LBO target. For 
example, Guo et al. (2011) find that the increase in operating cash flows are higher when the 
CEO is replaced right after the transaction. The same outcome is expected here.  
  
Hypothesis 2: Changes in operating performance of PTP LBO target firms are positively 
correlated with higher post-LBO leverage (H2) 
 
Consistent with the finance theory supporting the benefits of debt in reducing agency costs (the 
disciplining effects of debt), improvements in operating cash flows are expected to be greater 
in companies with a higher debt ratio. The positive effect of high leverage is explained in detail 
in the Literature Review section. The same outcome is expected in this study.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Changes in operating performance of PTP LBO target firms are positively 
correlated with stronger shareholder monitoring and governance (H3) 
 
As described by Jensen (1986) and Kaplan and Strömberg (2009), private equity firms apply 
operational and financial expertise and well-established governance principles to companies 
they invest in. Acharya et al. (2009) document that the private equity firms are active “hands-
on” shareholders. In accordance with the cited literature, changes in operating performance of 
PTP LBO firms should be positively correlated with stronger shareholder (i.e. private equity 
firm) involvement and monitoring. The same outcome is expected in this study.   
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1.4. Contributions of this Dissertation 
 
As mentioned above, this dissertation aims to address the scarcity of research with regard to the 
changes in operating performance of PTP/LBOs during the second wave of the early 2000s, 
and the third wave which started after the 2010s, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis 
in 2007.  It should be noted that there is little research done in this area in the selected timespan 
and geography. As mentioned above, most of the studies with regard to LBOs focused on the 
first wave or the 1990s. Furthermore, the US market still remain the main geographic market 
investigated by most academic research in this area.  
 
In addition, some other studies do not distinguish between public-to-private LBOs driven by 
outsiders (e.g. private equity) or insiders (MBOs). For instance, some similar studies on the 
same topic include pure MBO PTPs (with no private equity involvement) in their research 
scope, along with solely private equity-backed PTPs, as well as private equity-backed MBO 
PTPs. In this dissertation, private equity involvement is a required condition of the sample 
construction. Listed PTP deals in the database are included in the sample only if they actually 
involve private equity participation, be it an MBO or not. This is an important contribution to 
the literature, as different types of buyers may reflect completely different deal structures in 
terms of capital structure, deal size and other characteristics.  
 
Moreover, this dissertation takes a focused approach and emphasises the changes in operating 
performance of LBO firms in the post-LBO or the private period after being de-listed from the 
stock exchange. In other words, this present study examines the changes in operating 
performance during the entire private period under private equity firm (and sometimes 
management) ownership. This dissertation, therefore, aims to fill the existing gap in sources of 
value of LBOs in terms of operating performance from the time of PTP/LBO completion to the 
final outcome of the PTP/LBO (e.g. exit, or other outcome). There is little research focusing on 
operating performance improvements during the entire period under private equity firm 
ownership. For instance, Opler (1992) and Kaplan (1989a) only use a time window of (-1,+2), 
spanning from one financial year before buyout to two financial years after the completion of 
buyout. 
  
In light of the above, the content and questions investigated in this dissertation could be 
interesting for two distinct audiences, namely academia and the private equity industry.  
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1.5. Limitations of this Dissertation 
 
As in most financial research papers, the main challenge was to access the correct data on LBO 
transactions and targets, both pre- and post the transaction. The United Kingdom was selected 
as the geographical scope of this dissertation because it offered the most unified and complete 
data source for our research. Despite this, tracing back the entire financials of some companies 
that were taken private by private equity firms in the required time frame (deals completed 
between 2003 and 2015, with a condition of deal exit by 2018) was a great source of struggle 
in this dissertation. Moreover, the significant decline in the number of LBOs after the financial 
crisis in 2007 negatively affected the available sample size (full sample: 65 PTP transactions; 
subsample with complete post-buyout data: 54 PTP transactions).    
 
It could therefore be argued that a relatively short time frame and small sample size may limit 
the representativeness of the study. Moreover, transactions completed in the pre-2007 era 
formed the majority of the research sample. The number of PTP LBO transactions completed 
post-2007 were significantly lower. This was also an important caveat of this research. 
Moreover, this dissertation has only investigated exited deals until 2018 and deals that have not 
been exited are omitted from the scope of the study. As a major implication of this, it may be 
argued that this dissertation suffers from selection bias to a certain extent as only realised LBO 
investments are investigated. There is no doubt that some private equity firms will inevitably 
postpone their exit if the target firm is facing financial difficulties. The “unknown” number of 
distressed companies in investments that are not realised and/or exited by private equity firms 
may have a negative effect on the representativeness of the study conducted in this dissertation. 
  
1.6. Organisation of the Dissertation 
 
In terms of research organisation, the following structure will be followed: Chapter 2 will 
provide an overview of the academic literature and previous studies on LBOs. In Chapter 3, the 
data used in this research will be presented. Specifically, the logic behind each dataset collected 
will be explained, and a descriptive overview of the sample will be provided. Chapter 4 will 
present the method used in the analysis. This dissertation has specifically used the methodology 
used by Guo et al. (2011). Chapter 5 will present and discuss the analysis with regard to the 
changes in operating performance of PTP LBOs. An overview of the calculations will be given 
in order to determine determinants of the changes recorded in the operating performance of 
PTP LBO firms. Chapter 6 will conclude the study.  
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2.  Literature Review  
 
This chapter provides an overview of the academic literature relating to the value creation 
dynamics of LBOs. The review starts from the early literature and articles that opt for a more 
general perspective, and continues with the most relevant academic and empirical studies 
realised in the same or similar topic.   
 
2.1. Main Academic Literature in LBOs  
 
As suggested by Renneboog and Vansteenkiste (2017), the finance literature in LBOs can be 
split into four strands, each corresponding to a different stage of a typical PTP LBO transaction.  
 
Figure 2: Theoretical Framework of PTP LBO literature 
 
Note: For more information on different strands of PTP LBO literature, please refer to the Appendices/Figure 1 
of the working paper authored by Renneboog and Vansteenkiste (2017).  
 
  
Intent
• Data: Large sample of PTP LBOs + a control sample of 
companies remaining public 
• Methodology: Discriminant analysis, likelihood models 
Impact
• Data: Data of PTP LBOs together with data of wealth gain of 
selling shareholders 
• Methodology: Event study, premiums analysis
Process
• Data: Small sample for case studies or large sample for 
quantitative studies
• Methodology: Quantitative analysis (regressions etc.) or case 
studies
Duration
• Data: Large sample data on the holding period of private 
companies 
• Methodology: hazard functions 
 
 
 
Offer 
Delisting 
Exit 
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The research described in this document focuses on the third strand of the literature defining 
the LBO process, which spans from the delisting from a stock exchange to the exit transaction 
of the LBO-sponsors. Thus, the value created during the private status of the (previously listed) 
LBO target will be measured in an attempt to detect sources of performance changes in LBOs, 
using a set of transaction data relating to private equity-backed PTP transactions completed in 
UK from 2003 to 2015, and exited by 2018.    
 
As a result of the above, the literature review that follows focuses mainly on studies completed 
in the same research area, namely the third strand of the literature as defined above.  
 
2.2. Value Creation in PTP LBOs 
 
Public-to-private LBOs received considerable attention in academic literature. This was 
because most scholars considered the public company as a superior form of organization 
compared to the private company (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009). Listed companies were 
enjoying a higher degree of prestige and reputation in the market due to their ability to raise 
large amounts of capital and to maximize returns to shareholders.  
 
However, this attitude towards listed corporations began to change when the private company 
emerged as a strong alternative against the listed company over time (Jensen 1986, 1989). A 
considerable number of academic studies sought to understand the underlying reason why 
public companies taken private by a group of investors in an LBO transaction started 
outperforming their peers operationally and financially.  
 
In this regard, the academic literature focused mainly on explaining the motivations for PTP 
LBOs. The theoretical framework developed by scholars mainly revolves around the following 
hypotheses in order to shed light on shareholder wealth gains and improvements in operating 
performance as a result of PTP LBOs. 
 
 Shareholder-related agency costs theory: 
The principal explanation for going-private decisions is given by the shareholder-related agency 
costs theory, which was originally developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
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According to this theory, shareholders and managers have divergent interests when it comes to 
taking a set of decisions for the company. In this regard, the theory suggests that the manager 
(the agent) will often not act in the best interest of the shareholder (the principal) and “will 
choose a set of activities for the firm such that the total value of the firm is less than it would 
be if he were the sole owner” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This behavioural pattern called 
“shirking” by Jensen and Meckling characterises the motivation behind the decisions taken by 
the managers on firm activities on a selective basis. According to Jensen and Meckling, the 
ultimate purpose of the managers is to serve their own private benefits instead of increasing 
firm value, hence the apparent conflict of interest existing between shareholders and managers. 
Unable to exert a full control on the management activities, shareholders will endure an agency 
loss and will be a victim of an informational asymmetry. Agency losses are even higher when 
a company has a dispersed shareholding structure, as is the case in large listed corporations, 
where management control mechanisms are weaker than private companies or public 
companies with one major shareholder.   
In light of this, Jensen and Meckling’s analysis results in three hypotheses, which will be 
discussed in the sections that follow. These are the same as the ones used in existing academic 
studies that focused on the motivations behind PTP LBOs. For instance, Kaplan (1989a) studies 
a sample of large 76 MBOs closed between 1980 and 1986 in the US and demonstrates that 
MBOs outperform their peers in terms of net cash flow and operating income coupled with a 
reduction in capital expenditures. He finds that pre-buyout and post-buyout investors earn a 
combined median (industry-adjusted) return of 77%. Similarly, Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) 
document that PE companies create economic value by altering the target company’s capital 
structure, management incentives and corporate governance. The following hypotheses are the 
most recurrent in the finance literature with regard to value creation in LBOs.   
Incentive realignment hypothesis 
A way to reduce shareholder-related agency costs is to realign incentive schemes offered to the 
management. This could include financially more rewarding salary structures. Another way to 
achieve lower agency costs could be by increasing equity ownership of the management team 
in the firm. In this regard, Jensen (1989) even argued that the combination of concentrated 
ownership, performance-based managerial compensation and improved governance structures 
would make LBOs, amongst other corporate structures based on private ownership, the 
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“dominant corporate organisational form”, so that the public corporation would eventually 
disappear.  
A significant number of PTP LBOs involve management participation in equity, as a strategy 
used by PE companies to balance the interest of managers/agents with theirs. For instance, 
studying 76 MBOs that were completed in the US between 1980 and 1986, Kaplan (1989a) 
observes that percentage of equity owned by management increase from a median of 5.88% to 
22.63% during a typical LBO. He concludes that operating improvements and value gains are 
generated by positive incentive alignment rather than other factors. Similarly, Muscarella and 
Vetsuypens (1990) study reverse leveraged buyouts (RLBOs) (i.e. firms going public after 
undergoing an LBO transaction) of 72 firms that went public since 1983 in the US. They report 
an improvement in incentive alignment by increasing the equity holdings of the management; 
the outcome of this being a significant increase in profitability. It should be noted that the 
management ownership declines again when the company that was taken private again goes 
public after a few years (Muscarella and Vetsuypens, 1990). The reason of this change of 
incentive structure when the company goes public again is still not clear, as discussed by 
Holthausen and Larcker (1996), who study the accounting and market performance of a sample 
of 90 RLBOs that went public between 1983 and 1988 in the US. 
Similarly, Opler (1992) studies a sample of 44 PTP LBO transactions completed between 1985 
and 1989 in the US and concludes that improvements in the cash flow of companies subject to 
LBOs could be explained by reduced agency costs between shareholders and management and 
“disgorgement of free cash flow” as a result of cost cutting and efficient use of company 
resources. In fact, Opler finds that the operating cash flow/sales ratio during the post-LBO stage 
rose by 11.6% after industry adjustment. He also finds that the operating cash flows of the 
LBOs in his sample were in excess of US$ 2 billion and the net cash flow of those firms were 
even higher. Opler states that the excess operating cash flow should be one of the main causes 
that could explain the high rate of efficiency gains for investors.  
On the same topic, Easterwood et al. (1989) study a sample of large LBOs completed between 
1978 and 1985 in the US and analyse the relationship between the management-shareholder 
agency duality and the restructuring activities undertaken in the post-buyout stage. These 
researchers show that there is a greater emphasis placed on restructuring activities in the LBO 
firm, as the interests of managers and shareholders are more aligned due to the increased equity 
ownership of the management. 
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Free Cash Flow and Disciplining effect of Debt hypothesis  
The agency cost of free cash flows is another major hypothesis used to explain value creation 
in LBOs. As supported by Jensen (1986), the increased leverage reduces the free cash flow 
available to management’s discretion. Jensen goes on by defining free cash flow as the excess 
cash that could be deployed for positive Net Present Value (NPV) projects.  
In a study of large 33 LBOs that occurred in the US between 1980 and 1984, Liebeskind and 
al. (1992) argue that managers tend to invest in expansion and diversification projects (“empire 
building” as described by Jensen, 1986) in order to increase their rewards. However, this 
“empire building” strategy does not necessarily increase the firm’s market value.    
In an LBO structure, the disciplining effect of debt comes into play. Managers in an LBO are 
forced to generate sufficient cash and make efficient use of it, in order to avoid a default in debt 
repayments. In fact, if the firm goes insolvent/bankrupt, the management will lose all power 
and reputation relating to the company (Grossman and Hart, 1980, 1988).  
In other words, increased leverage mitigates the overinvestment, which could be defined as the 
practice of investing excessively, even in negative NPV projects. This particular issue is 
developed by Stulz (1988), who shows that debt is the best solution to the overinvestment 
problem by compelling managers to pay excess cash to debt providers.   
Most studies have shown that LBO firms undergo substantial restructuring in order to narrow 
the strategic focus of their business. According to Phan and Hill (1995), after a company is 
taken private, the management and shareholders facilitate a restructuring plan in order to 
improve the company’s effectiveness and efficiency. In a study of 72 firms that went public 
since 1983 after having completed an LBO transaction previously, Muscarella and Vetsuypens 
(1990) show that the vast majority of LBOs in their sample engaged in one of the following 
restructuring activities: redeployment of resources, improved operational efficiencies, new 
marketing plans and labour change. Similarly, Kovenock and Phillips (1997) study public and 
private firms engaged in manufacturing activities between 1979 and 1990 in the US. They show 
that high leverage brings higher profitability. According to them, this is result of improved 
productivity after eliminating unnecessary and unproductive assets in the LBO firm. The direct 
result of corporate and operational restructuring of LBO firms is reduced competition in the 
industry, which reinforces the LBO firm’s position in the market.   
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However, not everyone shares the same view on this issue. Other groups of researchers find no 
differences between buyouts and non-buyout companies in the same industry (Cohn et al., 
2014), when it comes to disciplining effects of debt or concentrated managerial ownership. In 
fact, Cohn et al. (2014) study a large sample of 317 LBOs that took place in the US from 1995 
to 2007 and find that the operating performance improvements of LBOs are not significant. 
Other researchers (e.g. Holthausen et al., 1996) are more reluctant to accept the disciplining 
effect of debt as a given fact. Having studied a sample of 90 reverse LBOs from 1976 to 1988 
in the US, Holthausen et al. (1996) assert that the change in leverage and managerial ownership 
could actually worsen the financial performance of the firm, because managers could reject 
high-risk and profitable (high NPV) projects and accept low risk and less profitable projects 
(low NPV).  As described by Holthausen et al. (1996), “(…) leverage could affect project 
selection by managers due to managerial risk aversion”. Similarly, Rappaport (1990) argues 
that high leverage and the resulting high level of debt repayments could actually jeopardise or 
“choke off” profitable investment opportunities and projects. 
Shareholder Monitoring/Control hypothesis 
It is also possible to see the shareholder-related agency cost hypothesis as an argument 
supporting debt financing over diversified “public equity”, which undermines effective 
shareholder monitoring upon management (Myers, 1993).  
As mentioned above, when a listed firm is taken private in an LBO, the shareholding structure 
becomes less diversified as there is, most of the time, one or two institutional shareholders (i.e.  
one or more private equity companies), which allows for more efficient shareholder monitoring 
of management. Acharya et al. (2009) argue that private equity firms are active investors and 
apply contractual limits to the management’s activities in the company. In a study of 
approximately a dataset of 9 million companies and 153 000 insolvencies during the period 
1995-2010, Wilson and Wright (2013) study the relation between private equity, buyout and 
insolvency risk. In a similar way to Acharya et al. (2009), Wilson and Wright (2013) define 
private equity firms on their experience in monitoring, and support the view that private equity 
investors are more proactive in “restructuring the finances of companies” with regard to debt 
repayments in order to avoid “insolvency risk, preserve assets and protect their reputation”. 
 
According to Kaplan and Strömberg (2009), it is widely accepted that private equity firms bring 
financial, governance and operational engineering to the companies they invest in. Kaplan and 
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Strömberg (2009) define “governance engineering” as “the way that private equity investors 
control the boards of their portfolio companies and are more actively involved in governance 
than boards of public companies”.   
 
As a result of this efficient monitoring structure, private equity firms tend to replace 
management much easier than other shareholders if the financial performance of the company 
remains low. For example, Acharya et al. (2009) show that PE funds have a “single-minded 
value creation focus” consisting of “leading the strategy of the firm through intense engagement 
with top management”, whereas PLCs (public limited companies) board often accept the 
strategy of the executive management.  Based on a sample of 60 large private equity buyouts 
that were exited between 2000 and 2007 in the UK, Acharya et al. (2009) find that the CEO of 
the firm is replaced in 69% of deals, and within the first 100 days in 39% of deals. On the other 
hand, the frequency of formal meetings is nine annually, which is the same as PLC board 
meetings. However, the number of informal meetings between the CEO and the private equity 
company is at least once a week throughout the investment period.  
 
Moreover, high leverage also allows for an increased monitoring by debt providers (e.g. banks) 
(Diamond, 1984) on the management and firm performance, which reinforces the corporate 
governance structure in the company and reduces the agency misalignment between 
shareholders and managers (Jensen, 1986). Citron et al. (1997) show that MBO loan agreements 
contain more covenants than general corporate lending agreements. They also show that 
communication between the bank/lender and the firm is of higher degree and frequency.   
 
 Other Hypotheses: 
Tax benefits 
The finance literature has also paid much attention to tax benefits generated by high leverage 
in public-to-private LBOs. For instance, Kaplan (1989b) studies tax benefits generated in 76 
management buy-outs of public companies from 1980 to 1986 in the US and demonstrates that 
the tax gains of these companies are in the range of 20% to 70% of the premium paid to 
shareholders during the de-listing process of the company. He explains this phenomenon by tax 
deductibility of the interest expense paid for high amounts of debt raised for the financing of 
the transactions. In addition, in a study of a sample of 317 LBOs that were completed in the US 
between 1995 and 2007, Cohn et al. (2014) show that the number of firms paying tax drastically 
declines at the buyout year and remains low after the first five years of the buyout period.   
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Undervaluation and Information Asymmetry 
 
In an effort to clarify the motivations behind PTP transactions, Renneboog, Simons and Wright 
(2007) study 177 PTP transactions that occurred in UK from 1997 to 2003. These authors find 
strong evidence that the LBOs in the UK are driven by the undervaluation hypothesis. Their 
study shows that past share performance of the PTP transactions during the second wave (1997-
2003) in the UK was the main motivation of buyouts. In fact, premiums paid to shareholders 
were even higher when the transaction involves the management (MBO) due to informational 
asymmetry. The latter suggests that management has greater insider information on the future 
outlook of the firm and thus, in most cases, management is ready to pay higher premiums to 
take control of the firm. Renneboog et al. (2007) observe that another source of shareholder 
wealth gain is increased tax gain due to high leverage ratio in LBOs.  
 
Market Conditions: Market Timing of Buyout and Exit; Industry and Macroeconomic Factors 
  
As shown by Kaplan and Strömberg (2009), market timing is another major value driver in 
LBOs.  In their study, Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) show that the private equity industry goes 
through recurring boom and bust cycles. It seems that the level of interest rates to earnings 
affect private equity activity in general, regardless of the fact it involves public or private 
companies.  
 
Market timing of buyout and exit is closely related with the investment strategy of private equity 
companies. As mentioned in the first section, private equity companies have a definite LBO 
investment time horizon of up to 5-7 years when investing in a target company. In a study of 
180 PTP buyouts that occurred between 1979 and 1986 in the US, Kaplan (1991) shows that 
the period of the median LBO target remaining private under private equity ownership is 6.82 
years.  
 
According to Kaplan and Strömberg (200), private equity investors take advantage of market 
timing and market mispricing in conformity with their investment duration or time horizon. The 
goal of private equity companies is to buy cheap and sell high (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009), 
as is the case with most investment approaches.    
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With regard to market effects, Valkama et al. (2013) observe that industry growth is one of the 
major value drivers increasing the return on investment, especially in MBOs compared to MBIs 
(probably due to the informational advantage of the inside management). Their study also 
provides evidence on the limited effect of other macro-economic variables on private equity-
backed buyouts.    
 
2.3. Empirical Studies in the United Kingdom and United States 
 
The US and UK markets have received considerable attention from scholars and researchers 
since the emergence of LBOs in 1980s. In this subsection of the literature review, an overview 
of the recent empirical studies carried out in the UK and US will be provided, in order to get an 
understanding of different questions raised by each of them. In particular, the studies will be 
compared in terms of theoretical frameworks and hypotheses.  
 
To the author’s knowledge, the following represents the main literature focusing on the UK and 
US-related PTP LBOs. Unfortunately, despite extensive research, no more recent research 
papers and studies on LBOs realised in the UK and US could be found, especially with regards 
to the post-PTP performance of LBO firms. There is extensive literature with regard to the first 
(i.e. Intent) and second strand (i.e. impact) of the literature. However, there is little up-to-date 
research in the third strand (i.e. process) of the literature.   
 
As expected, most academic research on LBOs, especially in the third strand of the literature, 
is confined to PTP transactions in the US market, the largest LBO market in the world. There 
is still limited research on LBO dynamics in the UK, even though it is the second largest LBO 
market after the US. Having said that, in both countries, the number of up-to-date and recent 
empirical research to measure the value creation of LBOs remains limited for the period post-
2008.  Similarly, little is known about LBO trends in Continental Europe and emerging markets, 
as both markets are still considerably underdeveloped compared to the UK and US LBO 
markets.   
 
In light of the above, empirical studies conducted in the 1980s will not be covered in this 
section, as the emphasis will be placed on relatively more recent academic studies. Most of the 
dated literature and empirical studies were, in fact, already discussed in Section 2.2. Therefore, 
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the scope of this present subsection will be limited to the most relevant empirical studies 
conducted in the UK and the US. 
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Table 5: Empirical Studies with regard to PTP LBOs in the UK1    
Authors 
Sample 
Period 
Transaction 
number (N) 
Transaction 
type 
Incentive 
realignment 
Free 
Cash 
Flow 
Governance 
/ Monitoring 
Undervaluation 
Tax 
Shield 
Other  
Hypotheses 
Green (1992)  1980-1984 8 MBO No      
Robbie and 
Wright (1995) 
1987-1989 5 MBI Yes Yes  Yes   
Harris, Siegel, 
Wright (1995) 
1994-1998 
35,752 
(manufacturing 
sites) 
MBO Yes      
Cressy, Munari, 
Malipiero (2007) 
1995-2000 122 PTP Yes     
Advantage-
to-
specialisation 
(Yes) 
Weir, Jones, 
Wright (2015) 
1998-2004 138 PTP Yes  Yes  Yes  
Valkama, Maula, 
Nikoskelainen, 
Wright (2013) 
1995-2004 321 ALL   
Yes but 
limited 
  
Industry 
growth (yes) 
 
                                                 
1 This table format is inspired by Renneboog and Vansteenkiste’s paper on the finance literature with regard to academic studies in LBOs. The above table is a more complete 
and up-to-date version of the overview provided by Renneboog and Vansteenkiste (2017).  This present overview includes only more recent academic studies involving LBOs 
that were completed in the UK.  
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One of the first studies relating to the LBO transactions in the UK is that of Green (1992), who 
conducts a cultural and behavioural analysis on changes in ownership and control subsequent 
to an LBO transaction. Thus, eight MBO transactions are analysed, and it is concluded that 
management becomes more entrepreneurial and motivated after a change in ownership. 
Furthermore, Green observes that this is not a pure consequence of the “incentive realignment 
hypothesis”, but that it seems that the altered ownership structure through management 
involvement has a positive effect on the attitude of management towards their responsibilities.  
  
In another case-study based investigation in the UK, Robbie and Wright (1995) analyse the 
effect of the changing ownership on corporate restructuring. This study specifically examines 
the success of Management Buy-ins (MBIs), and supports the importance of management 
incentives and new shareholder monitoring, while navigating problems relating to 
informational asymmetries between management and shareholders.   
 
More recently, the question of efficiency gains in the post-LBO period of companies has started 
to receive increasing interest from a number of scholars in the UK. For instance, in 2008, Harris, 
Siegel and Wright assess the total factor productivity (TFP) of a large number of manufacturing 
plants in the UK between 1994 and 1998. They research the effect of change of ownership on 
productivity and economic efficiency levels of the plants from the perspective of agency costs 
theory. After studying 35,752 manufacturing plants in the UK, they find that productivity 
increases considerably as the new owners reduce overhead and labour costs after the MBO 
transaction. This observation seems to be an indication of the improved agency costs in an 
MBO structure.      
 
In terms of post-LBO operating performance, Cressy et al. (2007) test whether private equity-
backed firms have higher post-LBO sales growth and operating performance (as measured by 
EBIT and EBIT/total assets) compared to comparable firms. They also test whether the private 
equity firm provides a competitive advantage to companies in which they invest. In order to 
verify their hypotheses, Cressy et al. (2007) study a sample of 122 LBOs that happened in the 
UK between 1995 and 2000, and a matching sample of comparable peers that have not been 
backed by a private equity firm. They conclude that the EBIT of buyout firms backed by private 
equity firms is 4.5% higher than their matched peers over the first three years following the 
LBO. They also find that that “specialised” private equity companies having expertise in 
executing buyouts in only a limited number of industries add an 8.5% profitability advantage 
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to the LBO firms’ performance.  Despite the observation of Cressy et al. (2007), one should 
also address the question whether the management manipulate key accounting figures such as 
EBITDA and EBIT by overstating earnings prior to an LBO deal in the hope of increasing the 
stock price (and the transaction value) and obtaining more favourable terms for debt-raising. 
This issue is actually discussed in a research conducted by Mao and Renneboog (2015) on 168 
LBO transactions completed from 1997 to 2007 in the UK. Mao and Renneboog (2015) find 
that the management of target firms engage in negative earnings manipulation to decrease price 
in the case of an MBO. On the other hand, positive earnings management in LBOs to increase 
valuation and leverage do not seem to play a prominent role, at least in the UK-based buyouts. 
Nevertheless, earnings manipulation or other manipulation techniques (such as asset 
revaluations or misrepresentation of production costs) should be taken into account when 
assessing the value creation mechanisms of LBOs. The misrepresentation of earnings is also an 
important factor to consider when assessing the exit deals by private equity firms which may 
give incentives to management to inflate earning numbers to secure a higher price at exit. 
 
In an effort to identify the drivers of firm-level returns under private equity ownership, Valkama 
et al. (2013) use a set of 321 exited private equity-backed buyouts in the UK from 1995 to 2004. 
The aim of the study is to assess the returns of buyouts backed by private equity firms. For this 
purpose, the authors use a set of variables in order to test the effect of the industrial and 
macroeconomic factors on firm-level returns. They find that use of leverage, size of the buyout 
and post-LBO acquisitions completed by the LBO target company under the ownership of the 
private equity company are major contributors to returns. They also find that industry growth 
has a significant effect on buyout returns, especially in divisional buyouts and MBOs (rather 
than MBIs – as a result of informational advantage of inside management). On the other hand, 
they find that the influence of macro-economic factors on buyout returns is weak.   
 
A recent study examines the correlation between the ownership and operating performance of 
firms taken private under an LBO structure.  Using a sample of 138 PTP buyouts completed in 
the United Kingdom from 1998 to 2004, Weir, Jones and Wright (2015) compare the 
performance outcomes of different PTPs, regardless of whether they are private equity backed 
or not. This research finds that private equity involvement does not have a statistically 
significant effect on profitability. Nevertheless, the performance of private equity-backed PTP 
deals is higher than the industry average, but not worse than non-private equity backed PTPs. 
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Other findings of this study are improved efficiency (lower expenses), and increased liquidity 
in all PTP deals.  
The following is a summary of empirical studies realised recently in the US. 
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Table 6: Empirical Studies with regard to PTP LBOs in the US 
 
Authors 
Sample 
Period 
Transaction 
number (N) 
Transaction 
type 
Incentive 
realignment 
Free 
Cash 
Flow 
Governance 
/Control 
/Monitoring 
Undervaluation 
Tax 
Shield 
Other  
Hypotheses 
Bruton, Keels, 
Scifres (2002) 
1980-1988 39 
Reverse 
LBOs  
Yes      
Leslie and 
Oyer (2008) 
1996-2005 144 
Reverse 
LBOs 
No      
Guo, 
Hotchkiss and 
Song (2011) 
1990-2006 192 ALL Yes Yes Yes No Yes  
Datta, Gruskin 
and Iskandar-
Datta (2013) 
1978-2006 208 
Reverse 
LBOs 
 Yes  Yes  Yes  
Cohn, Mills 
and Towery 
(2014) 
1995-2007 317 ALL    Yes Yes   
Ayash and 
Schütt (2016) 
1980-2006 183 ALL      
Accounting 
distortions 
Gao (2018) 1986-2007 208 ALL  No Yes    
 
 
 
 28 
 
When it comes to the US, there are a few interesting and recent empirical studies conducted 
with regard to the operating performance and value creation of LBOs during private ownership. 
As mentioned above, however, this subsection does not include an overview of more dated 
empirical studies as those were already presented in the first subsection of this chapter. Some 
of the first empirical studies already presented above include Kaplan (1989a), Bull (1989), 
Easterwood et al. (1989), Liechtenberg and Siegel (1990), Stulz (1988), Muscarella and 
Vetsuypens (1990), Opler (1992), Liebeskind et al. (1992), and Holthausen and Larcker (1996).  
 
In terms of corporate restructuring and performance of LBO firms, Bruton et al. (2002) examine 
a sample of 39 (reverse) LBOs whose secondary IPO was completed in the US between 1980 
and 1988. It should be noted that the main reason for these authors to examine reverse leveraged 
buyouts is linked to data availability. It is easier to find financial data for public companies in 
the US, as private companies are not obliged to disclose their financials. This study finds that 
performance, as measured by sales and profit margin, improve considerably during the private 
ownership period, although not very different from that of the peer companies in the controlling 
sample. The authors show that increased managerial ownership results in greater operating 
performance. In addition, Bruton et al. (2002) show that buyout companies engage in a 
corporate restructuring and strategic narrowing process during the private period. Their findings 
are consistent with the hypotheses pertaining to agency costs theory. 
 
One of the more recent studies on the operating performance of LBOs sponsored by private 
equity firms is realised by Leslie and Oyer (2008). Using a sample of 144 companies that go 
public after being previously owned by a private equity firm (i.e. Reverse LBOs), and a 
controlling sample of similar public companies, they find that managers of buyout firms are 
more incentivised compared to the managers of peer companies. For instance, in terms of equity 
ownership, the highest paid manager owns 3.3% more equity and earns an 11.9% lower salary 
compared to the controlling sample. Their study also indicates that private equity-backed firms 
have significantly more debt than their matched peers. Having said that, they also find that 
higher management incentives in LBO firms do not generate higher returns for Private equity 
firms. This study therefore questions the validity of the assumption that LBOs create value in 
terms of operating performance and financial returns to private equity investors.   
 
In a comprehensive study of different sources of value in 192 LBOs completed in the US 
between 1990 and 2006, Guo et al. (2011) test a number of hypotheses, involving agency costs, 
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the debt tax shield, and free cash flow theory, to name a few. They observe that the financial 
returns to pre-buyout and post-buyout capital are generally positive, except for distressed 
companies. On the other hand, in terms of operating performance (as measured by changes in 
ROS and ROA), LBO firms do not seem to outperform their counterparts in the same industries. 
They also show that higher debt provides for a greater tax shield, which increases cash flow 
gains of the LBO firms. In terms of agency costs, Guo et al. (2011) find that a CEO change has 
a positive effect on cash flow gains of the LBO firm at the completion of the buyout.   
  
In order to assess the correlation between capital structure and operating performance of LBO 
firms, Cohn et al. (2014) examine a sample of 317 buyouts completed in the US between 1995 
and 2007. They find no support on average for the hypothesis that an LBO leads to 
improvements in operating performance and efficiency. However, they find that their sub-
sample of 71 private LBO firms for which public financial data were available due to public 
debt issues, experience better firm performance, as measured by industry-adjusted Return on 
Assets and Return on Sales ratios. Private companies for which public financial data were not 
available (but for which tax returns could be obtained) do not experience any operating 
performance improvements. Another finding of this study relates to the tax shield hypothesis. 
In other words, these authors show that LBO firms have a higher debt ratio, which generate 
greater tax shields after the completion of the buyout.  
 
In another empirical study involving Reverse LBOs, Datta et al. (2013) study a comprehensive 
sample of 208 RLBOs completed in the US between 1978 and 2006.  They find that the main 
motivation for companies to engage in an LBO process could be explained by the 
undervaluation hypothesis. During the pre-buyout stage, those companies seem also to have 
higher leverage and performance compared to their peers, but a lower valuation. After the LBO 
completion, these firms enjoy greater efficiency and productivity as a result of cost-cutting and 
labour reduction. These firms’ valuation at the secondary IPO is significantly higher compared 
to the pre-buyout period, as a result of the corporate restructuring during the private period and 
disciplining effect of high leverage in cash flow management.  
Finally, the study conducted by Gao (2018) investigates the value creation in a sample of 208 
PTP LBOs completed in the US from 1986 to 2007. Gao (2018) finds that the influence of 
private equity investors on the LBO firms’ value creation is significant. In fact, value created 
through private equity influence is 7.8% of the pre-buyout market capitalisation of the LBO 
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firm. The strategic and corporate restructuring and active participation of the management of 
LBO firms seem to be among main sources of value and returns for private equity investors.  
However, value created through debt is insignificant. On this point, Gao says the following: 
“(...) the value created through debt is insignificant, which means that at buyout consummation, 
the ex-ante benefits of debt are equal to the ex-ante costs of financial distress.”  Gao also finds 
that club deals involving several private equity investors generally involves a higher degree of 
leverage. 
Lastly, Ayash and Schütt (2016) study a sample of 183 PTP LBOs that happened between 1980 
and 2006 in the US. Thus, they review the dataset of Kaplan (1989a) and Guo et al. (2011) and 
reproduce the results of these two studies with slightly changed accounting measures. They 
show that the typical accounting data used to measure value creation and operating performance 
of LBOs is highly sensitive to subtle accounting issues. By modifying some accounting data in 
their own research, they find that the operating improvements of LBO firms in the post-buyout 
period are actually not significant. The results obtained by Ayash and Schütt (2016) are 
interesting as they are not consistent with previous research which indicates value creation and 
improvements in operating performance after a firm goes private under an LBO structure.   
2.4. Conclusion  
 
In conclusion, LBOs and especially PTP LBOs have been a major phenomenon of economic 
and financial markets since 1980s. There exists exhaustive literature on the topic, in particular 
with regard to the first and second strand of the literature. However, most research papers 
concerning the operating performance of LBOs under private ownership are outdated and there 
is need for more up-to-date research in this area. Therefore, in an effort to fill this gap, this 
dissertation is aimed at providing some insights to the operating performance changes of recent 
PTP LBOs in the UK market, from the perspective of the shareholder related-agency costs and 
free cash flow/disciplining effects of debt theories. Thus, a significant number of past studies 
focusing on the first wave of LBOs document that going-private LBOs show performance 
improvements after buyout completion. However, a growing number of studies published more 
recently question this approach considering, especially the high default rates and negative 
performance of private equity-backed companies, especially after the financial crisis in 2007. 
In light of the results obtained in previous studies, this dissertation will aim to assess the recent 
PTP LBO deals in an effort to clarify to what extent the PTP LBO firms in the research sample 
show performance improvements and what the sources of gains are in terms of operating 
performance in target PTP LBO firms.   
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3.  Sample and Data 
 
This chapter will explain the data collection and sample selection process used on this study. 
This will include a detailed overview of the resources used in data collection. Finally, in a 
separate subsection, the sample characteristics will be summarised to provide a snapshot of PTP 
LBO transaction details that happened between 2003 and 2015. 
 
3.1. Data Collection  
 
The lack in availability of public data has always been the most challenging part of studies 
pertaining to value creation in LBOs. It is therefore not surprising that the finding and accessing 
of relevant and reliable data posed the biggest risk to the completion of this study.   
 
Several databases were used to access relevant figures and information on different parties 
involved in an LBO transaction. Most of the data was hand-collected, as the information 
required for this study was sparse and unorganised. Fortunately, the required data is mostly 
available in public resources or databases, given that all companies incorporated in the United 
Kingdom (including private companies) are obliged to deliver their annual reports to 
Companies House, as per the provisions of Companies Act 2006 and other relevant legislation. 
The annual reports must include their detailed profit and loss statement and balance sheet, 
including notes to the accounts. Companies may also be required to submit their group company 
accounts, a directors’ report, and finally an auditor’s report, when appropriate.    
 
The typical data collection process on a company that underwent a PTP LBO for the purposes 
of this study was as follows, as explained below in detail for each step:  
 
Table 7: Data Construction  
 
Database / source Action  
Merger Market and S&P Capital IQ 
Generate lists of PTP LBOs completed between 
2003 and 2015 in the UK 
S&P Capital IQ  
Generate the historical financials of LBO firms 
before going private  
Companies House, FE Investegate 
and Merger Market  
Find official deal offer documents and identify the 
name of the “acquisition vehicle” created by the 
 32 
 
private equity investor (together with management 
or not) 
Companies House  
Find the consolidated annual reports of the new 
holding company that acquired the LBO firm. 
Access company reports and financial information of 
the LBO firm under private ownership starting from 
the last financial year before LBO to the last 
financial year before deal outcome/exit 
FE Investegate 
Access official deal offer documents to obtain more 
information on the structure and financing of the 
transaction  
FE Investegate, Companies House 
and Merger Market 
Access historical and current shareholding and 
management information 
Capital IQ  
Find industry data based on SIC codes of the LBO 
firm and its peers with the same first four-digit SIC 
code  
Other  
Collect information on deal resolution and exit deals 
on public databases, i.e. news, corporate websites of 
LBO firms and private equity firms etc.  
 
As briefly summarised above, the data collection process started with the generation of a list of 
going private LBO transactions that occurred in the United Kingdom between 2003 and 2015. 
A PTP LBO transaction was included in the sample provided that the investment of the private 
equity fund with or without the participation of the management reached an outcome (e.g. 
exit/disinvestment, and if the latter had not occurred, another outcome such as insolvency) by 
2018.  
 
Two PTP deal lists were generated using both the Merger Market and Capital IQ databases. 
Merger Market does not cover public-to-private LBO deals backed by private equity firms. 
Therefore, as a first step, deals that did not involve private equity investments were eliminated 
from the list generated by Merger Market.  As a second condition, deals smaller than 
£20 million were removed from the list, because public data is scarce and sometimes not 
available for small sized deals and companies. 
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A similar approach was followed with the deal list generated by Capital IQ, with one difference. 
Capital IQ includes private transactions that involve private equity firms as investors. Deals 
smaller than £20 million were again eliminated, however. After going through both lists and 
removing duplicated transactions, one “master list” of PTP LBO transactions was created.   
 
The original master list included 101 PTP LBO deals that were completed between 2003 and 
2015. The deal number decreased to 91 after 10 deals smaller than £20 million in terms of 
transaction value were removed from the list. Another 22 deals were eliminated as, by 
December 2018, they were still owned by the same private equity firm (i.e., exit had not taken 
place yet).  Another four deals were deleted from the list as there was no information at all on 
their deal structures, investors and financing, as well as deal resolution. The final sample for 
this study thus consisted of 65 PTP LBO transactions that reached a final outcome under the 
ownership of the private equity firm.  
 
As a next step, the target firms that went private under an LBO or MBO structure backed by a 
private equity firm were examined one by one. First, the financials of the sample companies 
before buyout were sourced from the Capital IQ database. Unfortunately, Capital IQ does not 
provide the financial figures of companies under private ownership, unless they do go public 
again (i.e. reverse LBOs) after the completion of the buyout process. Therefore, financials of 
companies that went private for a certain period of time before going through a post-LBO IPO 
process were collected solely from Capital IQ.  There were thirteen deals that matched this 
particular condition in the full sample.  
 
After collecting the financial figures of the last financial year before buyout from Capital IQ, 
the name of the acquisition vehicle created by the private equity firm, along with the 
participation of the target firm management, if applicable, had to be identified. For this purpose, 
the official bid/offer document was downloaded from FE Investegate. Thereafter, the content 
of this document was compared to the information provided by Merger Market and Companies 
House. 
 
In term of deal structure, the general tendency of private equity firms when investing in a target 
company is to create an acquisition vehicle, which is itself owned by a holding company. The 
acquisition vehicle will usually acquire the shares of the target LBO firm, and the financials of 
the latter can then be accessed in the consolidated financial accounts of the holding company, 
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described as the “ultimate parent company” in the annual reports of the acquired LBO firms. 
The acquisition vehicle is generally described as the “immediate parent company” in the annual 
reports of the LBO firm after the buyout process.  
 
Moreover, name changes are common after going private. Therefore, the identity of the LBO 
firms had to be thoroughly verified in the annual reports of all parties involved in an LBO 
process. Therefore, annual reports of the LBO firm itself, together with those of the acquisition 
vehicle and holding company (and of other subsidiaries, if any) were extensively cross-checked, 
to ensure there were no faulty data in the research sample.    
 
To briefly summarise, the identity of the ultimate parent company was ascertained in the offer 
document, as well as the first annual report of the target LBO firm after the completion of the 
buyout. The financial figures of the LBO firm were accessed using the group accounts of the 
ultimate parent company. After completing the entire verification process, all relevant financial 
data were hand-collected starting from the first financial year after going private to the last 
financial year before the end of the Private equity ownership. 
 
After completion of the above steps, more information on the relevant deal structures and 
financing was gathered by reading through bid/offer documents delivered by the private equity 
firm along with the management team, if the latter was involved in the transaction. 
FE Investegate, a public database, was used as the main source of information for this purpose. 
Offer documents generally contain meaningful information on the shareholding structure that 
follow the buyout process. Based on data gathered from offer documents, pre- and post-buyout 
shareholding structures (i.e. the equity holdings of the private equity firm and when appropriate, 
of the executive management team) were then cross-checked and verified – again by referring 
to annual reports provided by Companies House and transaction comments published by 
Merger Market.  
 
Offer documents also contain significant information on expected changes in key management 
and the executive team in the post-buyout process. Expected management changes were then 
checked for accuracy through public resources and annual reports as made available by 
Companies House.  
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Other key matters included in offer documents encompass the financing structure of the buyout, 
including debt raised and cash used in the acquisition of the target firm. Financing information 
provided in the offer documents were verified by referring to the annual reports and balance 
sheets of LBO firms for the first financial year following the buyout completion.  
 
Next, the SIC code (Standard Industrial Classification Code) of the LBO firm was identified as 
provided by Capital IQ. The SIC code is numerical system which classifies the industries by a 
four-digit code.  The SIC code was used to match the LBO firm with other comparable public 
companies having the same four-digit SIC code.  
 
Lastly, the industry classification based on SIC codes was used to collect annual data on the 
average performance of listed peer companies and the related industry, for the same duration 
as the holding period of the investment by the private equity firm (i.e. from the last financial 
year preceding the buyout to the last financial year at deal resolution or exit).   
 
3.2. Sample Selection 
 
In terms of sample selection, the following criteria were followed:  
 
 As mentioned above, deals smaller than £20 million were excluded from the sample due 
to data scarcity on small sized deals and companies. 
 In order to be included in the sample, the buyout process had to reach an outcome, which 
could be either an exit deal (e.g. IPO, strategic investor sale, SBO etc.) or other possible 
outcomes (e.g. insolvency, liquidation etc). 2018 was chosen as the last financial year 
required for exit in order to be included in the research sample of this study. 
 Following the approach of Guo et al. (2011), firms that were purchased to be merged 
with another operating company were eliminated from the list, as it would be difficult 
to measure the individual operating performance of the LBO target after its merger with 
another business. In addition, companies acquired in a distressed position or using the 
equity of another company in the portfolio of the private equity firm were omitted from 
the sample, on the basis of Guo et al.’s (2011) description of these companies as having 
“atypical characteristics”.   
 In the present sample, four deals were deleted from the list because of insufficient 
information on the transaction. It is worth noting that these deals were completed by 
some of the largest private equity firms (e.g. Blackstone). These private equity firms do 
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sometimes opt for a more secretive structures, where the acquisition vehicle or the 
holding company is incorporated in offshore jurisdictions such as Bermuda, the Cayman 
Islands and the like. In such cases, it is not possible to access the consolidated financial 
statements and annual reports of these LBO firms, as their holding company is not based 
in the United Kingdom and has, therefore, no obligation to publicly disclose its financial 
accounts.  
 
3.3.  Data collected  
 
In order to measure the changes in operating performance of companies that went through a 
PTP LBO process, a number of accounting figures were collected from the financial statements 
of companies, as described hereafter. 
 
Table 8: Description of Financial and Accounting Figures Collected  
Data Type Description 
Transaction value This is the deal value as provided by Merger 
Market and Capital IQ. It is the price or 
amount paid inclusive of net debt incurred by 
the buyer. 
Accounting data for one financial year before 
buyout (T-1) and one financial year after 
buyout (T+1) 
Sales, EBIT, EBITDA, interest expense, total 
assets, long term debt, short term debt, 
shareholder funds. 
Accounting data for the last financial year  
(Tlast year) before deal outcome/exit 
Sales, EBIT, EBITDA, interest expense, total 
assets, long term debt, short term debt, 
shareholder funds. 
 
 
Thereafter, the following data was collected in order to test the effect of agency costs following 
a PTP LBO. 
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Table 9: Description of Post-buyout Management Data collected   
 
Data Type Description 
Management equity participation A yes/no question. If the management contributed to 
the equity, then this variable took the value of 1. If not, 
it took the value of 0.  
Management equity participation If the answer to the first question above was a “yes”, 
then the percentage of management equity holdings 
was provided in the following format: “x %” 
CEO change If the CEO of the LBO target firm was replaced in the 
next financial year following the buyout, then this 
variable took the value of 1. If not, it took the value of 
0.  
CEO becomes Chairman If the CEO of the LBO firm becomes chairman in the 
next financial year following the buyout, then this 
variable took the value of 1. If not, it took the value of 
0.  
Club PE A yes/no question. If there was more than one private 
equity firm involved as buyer/investor in the 
transaction, then this variable took the value of 1. 
Board size This refers to the number of persons present in the 
board of directors in the first financial year following 
the buyout. 
Sponsor director ratio This refers to the number of persons representing the 
private equity firm(s) in the board of directors in the 
first financial year following the buyout. It is 
expressed in the form of a ratio.  
 
3.4. Sample Characteristics 
 
The full sample contained 65 public-to-private transactions, whereas the subsample with 
sufficient post-buyout information includes 54 PTP deals. The first element that stands out in 
both samples is the absence of any private equity backed PTP transactions in 2013 in the United 
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Kingdom. Moreover, neither the full sample nor the subsample include any exited PTP LBOs 
completed in 2014. Thus, of the four PTP deals completed in 2014, none had reached an 
outcome as at December 2018.  
 
It should also be noted that the number of PTP LBOs declined significantly after the global 
financial crisis that created financial fragility and hindered private equity firms’ ability to access 
financing instruments. In fact, as described by Kaplan and Strömberg (2009), “From the 
summer of 2007 into mid-2008, interest rates on buyout-related debt have increased 
substantially – if buyout debt can be raised at all.” Moreover, as stated by Wilson and Wright 
(2013), private equity firms were criticised for their use of highly leveraged capital structures 
causing high default rates amongst private equity backed companies during the global financial 
crisis.  
 
For this reason, PTP deals completed after 2009 have a median deal value of £79 million, while 
the median transaction value is £218 million for the subsample for 54 PTP LBOs completed 
from 2003 to 2015. Another consequence of this phenomenon relates to the yearly transaction 
distribution – almost two thirds of the PTP deals listed in the samples were completed before 
2009. While the main reason for this is the temporary decline in PTP LBOs in the aftermath of 
the global financial crisis, another cause is related to duration or holding period of those 
companies by private equity firms. Thus, as mentioned in the previous sub-section, there were 
approximately 20 deals in the sample that had not been exited as at December 2018. 
 
With regards to deal size, the median transaction values for the full sample and subsample are 
£225 million and £218 million, respectively. The minimum transaction value in the deal list is 
approximately £24 million and the largest deal had a transaction value of £3 400 million. The 
two samples do not differ significantly in terms of median values.  
 
Observation of pre-buyout accounting data also suggest no significant differences between the 
samples. For instance, the median EBITDA margins for the full sample and subsample are 
15,32% and 15,26% respectively. Following a similar trend, the median EBIT margins of the 
full sample and the subsample are 9,75% and 10,06% respectively.  In terms of sales, the full 
sample has a median value of £118 million, whereas the subsample has a median value of £122 
million. Similarly, with regards to the pre-buyout total debt measure, companies in the full 
sample and the subsample both have a median debt amount of £48-50 million, although the 
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standard deviation of total debt is quite high (i.e. in the range of £1 000 million for both 
samples).  Table 10 provides an overview of pre-buyout accounting data for both samples.  
 
Table 11 provides a summary of annual leverage ratios of LBO firms in the research sample. 
Referring to the subsample with complete post-buyout data, the median value of EBITDA to 
capital is 9,62% during the pre-buyout period. In addition, the median value of debt to capital 
is 20,67% at the same period. However, the median value of debt to capital moves up to 92,14%, 
after buyout, as expected.  
 
Deals completed in the United Kingdom during the 2003-2015 were highly leveraged. The 
median value of change in debt to capital in the research time span was in the order of 60% 
between the pre-buyout and post-buyout periods. The debt to EBITDA ratio follows a similar 
trend as it rose from 2,06 to 8,03, which also points out to large amounts of debt used by private 
equity investors when financing PTP LBOs, especially in the early 2000s. It should also be 
noted that median values of the full sample and the subsample with post-buyout data do not 
display any significant difference.    
 
Making a similar analysis on a full sample of 192 PTP LBOs and 94 PTP buyouts in the US 
between 1990 and 2005 with sufficient post-buyout data, Guo et al. (2011) find a median pre-
buyout and post-buyout debt to capital ratio of 23.9% and 70.7%, respectively. This compares 
to the post-buyout debt to capital ratio of 92,14% of the present sample. This observation 
suggests that buyouts completed in the 2000s, especially between 2003 and 2007, had a much 
riskier capital and financing structure. Indeed, the post-buyout debt to capital shrinks to 31% 
after 2009 in the subsample examined in this dissertation. On the other hand, Kaplan (1989a) 
finds a median pre- and post-buyout debt to capital ratio of 20,7% and 85,6% for 76 MBOs 
completed in the US between 1980 to 1986, which are more in line with the sample used in this 
study.  
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Table 10: Key accounting data of sample of target LBO firms during the pre-buyout period 
This table presents the key accounting figures of LBO firms at the last financial year preceding the buyout for companies listed in the full sample of 65 PTP 
LBOs, along with the subsamples with and without post-buyout data. LBO price (or Capital) is the amount paid in £ million by buyers. Total debt, interest paid, 
sales, total assets, shareholder funds and short-term loans are all expressed in £ million.  EBIT and EBITDA margins are expressed in %. Difference (I)-(II) is 
the difference between median values of key accounting figures belonging to the two subsamples, with and without post-buyout data.  Pre-buyout data of PTP 
LBO firms were sourced from Capital IQ. The table format is adapted from Guo et al. (2011). 
 
Sample   Full Sample, 65 LBOs    
Subsample with complete post-buyout data, 
54 LBOs (I) 
Subsample without post-buyout data, 
11 LBOs (II) 
  
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
Variable 
Mean  Median Std. Dev.  Mean Median Std. Dev.  Mean  Median Std. Dev.  
Difference 
(I)-(II) 
              
LBO price (Capital) 603,95 225,51 1093,73  647,54 218,82 1180,24  389,95 245,60 418,92  -26,79 
Pre-buyout total debt  240,55 48,90 994,92  265,86 50,65 1079,03  103,85 37,83 160,42  12,82 
              
Sales 394,89 118,30 772,18  366,35 122,61 601,41  535,04 102,18 1313,05  20,43 
EBITDA % 13,51% 15,32% 38,42%  17,64% 15,26% 11,11%  -6,79% 15,33% 87,31%  -0,08% 
EBIT% 6,07% 9,75% 45,80%  11,26% 10,06% 10,56%  -19,40% 6,34% 105,21%  3,72% 
              
Total Assets  531,00 166,49 944,63  552,14 182,75 1004,58  427,23 161,26 552,86  21,49 
Shareholder funds 181,60 80,05 373,22  177,45 80,05 392,40  204,00 77,05 243,73  3,00 
Short term loans 19,50 1,70 47,36  22,35 1,98 51,00  4,11 1,08 5,37  0,91 
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Table 11: Annual leverage ratios of PTP LBO sample firms during the pre- and post-buyout period 
The table below is a compared overview of leverage ratios between the pre- and post-buyout period. The first section of the table contains data on the full sample 
of 65 PTP LBOs, and the second section focuses on the subsample of 54 PTP LBOs with post-buyout information. The PTP LBO transactions are distributed 
annually according to their year of completion. Capital is the buyout price in million £. Pre-buyout EBITDA to Capital is the ratio of EBITDA to Capital in the 
year preceding the buyout (year T-1). Pre-buyout debt is the amount of debt as at T-1. Post-buyout debt is the sum of debt raised at buyout and the amount of debt 
already present in the pre-buyout period. Change in debt to capital is the median % change between pre- and post-buyout debt divided by Capital. The same 
logic was applied to the ratios of pre- and post-buyout debt to EBITDA. Pre-buyout data was sourced from Capital IQ. Post-buyout data was sourced from deal 
offer documents and annual reports obtained from Companies House. The table format is adapted from Guo et al. (2011). 
 
Full Sample (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Year 
Number of 
PTP LBOs 
Capital 
(Million £) 
Pre-buyout 
EBITDA to 
Capital (%) 
Pre-buyout 
Debt to 
Capital (%) 
Pre-buyout 
Debt to 
EBITDA  
Post-buyout 
Debt to 
Capital (%) 
Post-buyout 
Debt to 
EBITDA 
Change in 
Debt to 
Capital % 
 
 
2003 7 192,00 14,59% 22,11% 1,34 95,84% 5,85 73,73% 
2004 4 474,25 14,51% 22,68% 1,45 80,55% 5,36 57,87% 
2005 15 296,20 7,92% 19,45% 2,05 92,05% 8,33 72,61% 
2006 13 249,68 9,64% 20,55% 1,95 87,10% 9,83 66,56% 
2007 8 258,19 6,61% 17,68% 1,85 104,98% 10,53 87,30% 
2008 7 230,74 7,94% 21,27% 2,60 97,95% 10,79 76,68% 
2009 3 149,96 18,74% 25,76% 1,19 31,09% 0,72 5,32% 
2010 3 372,07 11,44% 15,85% 1,33 65,25% 5,54 49,40% 
2011 2 54,69 9,98% 0,00% 0,00 60,84% 6,71 60,84% 
2012 2 40,20 7,97% 0,05% 0,04 0,17% 0,05 0,12% 
2013 0 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
2014 0 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
2015 1 78,80 11,23% 26,37% 2,35 19,67% 1,75 -6,70% 
2003-2015 65 225,51 9,64% 20,08% 1,98 84,29% 7,44 60,84% 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Year 
Number of 
PTP LBOs 
Capital 
(Million £) 
Pre-buyout 
EBITDA to 
Capital (%) 
Pre-buyout 
Debt to 
Capital (%) 
Pre-buyout 
Debt to 
EBITDA 
ratio 
Post-buyout 
Debt to 
Capital (%) 
Post-buyout 
Debt to 
EBITDA 
Difference in 
Debt to 
Capital  
(4)-(6) 
Subsample with post-buyout data         
2003 6 235,34 15,18% 29,67% 1,95 116,06% 7,24 86,39% 
2004 4 474,245 14,51% 22,68% 1,45 80,55% 5,36 57,87% 
2005 10 240,095 8,89% 21,89% 2,13 98,33% 12,00 76,44% 
2006 12 230,9 9,55% 19,03% 2,04 87,10% 9,83 68,08% 
2007 6 354,085 6,10% 21,42% 2,08 108,56% 11,72 87,14% 
2008 7 230,74 7,94% 21,27% 2,60 97,95% 10,79 76,68% 
2009 1 225,51 21,68% 25,76% 1,19 31,09% 1,43 5,32% 
2010 3 372,07 11,44% 15,85% 1,33 65,25% 5,54 49,40% 
2011 2 54,69 9,98% 0,00% 0,00 60,84% 6,71 60,84% 
2012 2 40,195 7,97% 0,05% 0,04 0,17% 0,05 0,12% 
2013 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
2014 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
2015 1 78,8 11,23% 26,37% 2,35 19,67% 1,75 -6,70% 
2003-2015 54 218,82 9,62% 20,67% 2,06 92,14% 8,03 60,84% 
Full sample   65 225,51 9,64% 20,08% 1,98 84,29% 7,44  
Subsample with post-buyout data (1)  54 218,82 9,62% 20,67% 2,06 92,14% 8,03  
Subsample without post-buyout data (2) 11 245,6 11,81% 16,35% 1,55 48,16% 1,89  
Difference in medians (1)-(2)  -26,79 -2,19% 4,32% 0,51    
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When it comes to deal outcomes as presented in Table 12, the majority (i.e. 31,48%) of deals 
in the subsample of 54 PTP LBOs were exited via a Secondary Buyout (SBO) involving another 
private equity firm. A further 29,63% of sample LBO firms taken private by private equity 
firms were sold to a strategic buyer. Finally, 24,83% of the sample LBO firms went public 
again after the end of the private equity ownership. Lastly, 14,81% of deals in the subsample 
ended up in a distressed situation. In many cases, private equity firms were forced to exit as 
those companies were taken over by lenders after defaulting on their liabilities.  Other 
companies ended up in an administration or insolvency process.  
 
With regard to distressed companies, the above finding is in line with that of Guo et al. (2011), 
who find that 15% of LBO firms taken private ended in a distressed situation and were taken 
over by their lenders. Compared to Guo et al. (2011) findings, the share of SBOs seems to have 
grown significantly. In the study of Guo et al. (2011), the share of SBOs was 15% for their 
subsample with sufficient post-buyout data. In this dissertation, the share of SBOs is 31,48%.  
 
On the other hand, Strömberg (2008) find a failure rate of 6% for private equity transactions 
completed between 1970 and 2002. However, Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) claim that a failure 
rate of 6% could be underestimating the reality of financial distress amongst private equity-
backed firms due to their highly leveraged capital structures. Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) 
suggest that these distressed companies “may be hidden in the relatively large fraction of 
“unknown” exits (11%)” in some research samples. They also think that these empirical 
analyses may suffer from selection bias as only realised investments are included in the scope 
of research. On the other hand, private equity investors may be unwilling to engage in a 
potential exit deal in the hope of possibly reversing the company’s financial situation and 
improving their investment returns by doing so (Kaplan, 1989a).  It should also be noted that 
Andrade and Kaplan (1998) find a default rate of 23% for 31 highly leveraged large public to 
private transactions completed in the 1980s in the US.  
     
Although there are different views on the rate of failure of PTP buyouts, the distressed company 
rate as a deal outcome as presented in this dissertation is close to the findings of Guo et al. 
(2011), who included a significant number of distressed companies in their sample of research.   
As described above, the research sample includes 54 PTP LBOs with sufficient post-buyout 
data. The analysis in this dissertation will be essentially be based on the PTP LBO firms in the 
subsample.  
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3.5. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, the characteristics of the research samples were summarised. The full sample 
contains 65 PTP LBOs, whereas the subsample with post-buyout data contains 54 PTP LBO 
deals completed in the UK between 2003 and 2015. Only deals that achieved an outcome (e.g. 
exit, distressed state etc.) were included in the sample.  General characteristics and findings of 
the research sample are similar to those studied in major previous research papers.  The tables 
below provide a summary overview of the research sample, including the full sample and 
subsample with post-buyout data.
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Table 12: Post-buyout deal resolutions/exits  
This table provides an overview of deal outcomes and exit deals for both the full sample of 65 PTP LBOs and the subsample of 54 PTP LBOs with sufficient 
post-buyout information. The first section focuses on the full sample. The second section relates to the subsample with post-buyout data. The PTP deals are 
distributed according to their year of completion. For instance, seven going private LBOs were completed in 2003. In other words, the year 2003 does not 
indicate the year of exit, but is the year during which the LBO firm went private. Out of those seven deals in 2003, two were exited via an IPO, two via strategic 
sale, and one via an SBO. The remaining two deals ended up in a distressed state. For ease of reference, IPO is initial public offering; Sold means the LBO firm 
is sold to a strategic investor; and SBO means the LBO firm is sold to another private equity firm. Firms that are in a distressed state means that they are either 
taken over by their lenders or are insolvent. The table format is adapted from Guo et al. (2011). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Year (deal completion date) IPO Sold  SBO Distressed  Unknown  Total 
Full Sample       
       
2003 2 2 1 2 0 7 
2004 1 0 2 1 0 4 
2005 1 6 5 3 0 15 
2006 4 7 2 0 0 13 
2007 2 2 2 1 1 8 
2008 1 1 3 2 0 7 
2009 1 0 1 0 1 3 
2010 0 1 2 0 0 3 
2011 0 0 2 0 0 2 
2012 0 1 0 1 0 2 
2013 - - -  - - - 
2014 - - - - - - 
2015 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Total 2003-2015 13 20 20 10 2 65 
% of deals 20,00% 30,77% 30,77% 15,38% 3,08% 100% 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Year (deal completion date) IPO Sold  SBO Distressed  Unknown Total  
 
Subsample with post-buyout data 
  
      
       
2003 2 2 1 1 0 6 
2004 1 0 2 1 0 4 
2005 1 4 3 2 0 10 
2006 4 6 2 0 0 12 
2007 2 1 2 1 0 6 
2008 1 1 3 2 0 7 
2009 1 0 0 0 0 1 
2010 0 1 2 0 0 3 
2011 0 0 2 0 0 2 
2012 0 1 0 1 0 2 
2013 - - - - - - 
2014 - - - - - - 
2015 1 0 0 0 0 1 
       
2003-2015 13 16 17 8 0 54 
% of deals 24,07% 29,63% 31,48% 14,81% 0,00% 100% 
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4.  Method 
 
4.1. Method used to measure Operating Performance 
 
The research methodology used in this study to evaluate the performance changes that take 
place after a firm goes private through an LBO process, was adapted from that used by Andrade 
and Kaplan (1998) and Guo et al. (2011), who respectively investigated the return to capital of 
31 highly-leveraged transactions (HLTs) during late 1980s, and 192 leveraged buyouts 
completed between 1990 and 2006 in the US market.   
 
The following diagram, which is an improved version of the diagram provided by Kaplan 
(1989a), provides a detailed overview of the time variable as measured in most LBO-related 
research papers, including that of Guo et al. (2011). To summarise, the timeline in most LBO 
studies is understood to be as follows. 
 
Figure 3: Timeline of a typical LBO process 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: adapted and improved version of the diagram from Kaplan (1989a) 
 
Following the example of Guo et al. (2011), the correlations between changes in operating 
performance of PTP LBO firms with other factors such as improved management incentives, 
improved monitoring of management by shareholders, and the disciplining effect of debt, were 
evaluated in this study.  
 
To do so, the operating performance of LBO firms were firstly estimated from T-1 to Tlast year, 
being the last year before exit of the LBO investment, after which the observed changes in 
operating performance were related to a number of variables to which these changes should be 
theoretically linked.   
 
Company is listed on a stock exchange  
Last financial 
year before 
buyout  
LBO 
announcement  
LBO completion: 
company is de-listed   
Exit (SBO, IPO, strategic investor sale etc.) 
or other outcome (distressed/insolvency etc.)  
  
Company is owned 
either by a PE firm or 
management + PE firm  
T-1 T0 Tlast year  
 
Private Period 
This dissertation focuses on 
changes in operating 
performance of LBO firms 
from T-1 to Tlast year 
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The following table is a summary overview of operating ratios used in previous studies.  
 
Table 13: Operating Performance ratios used in previous studies  
 
Research Performance ratios 
Kaplan (1989a) Net cash flow/Sales, Operating Income/Sales 
Net cash flow/Total assets. 
Guo et al. (2011) EBITDA/sales, Net cash flow/sales. 
EBITDA/Total Assets, Net Cash Flow/Total Assets.  
Opler (1992) Operating cash flow/sales, Operating cash 
flow/employee 
Net cash flow/sales, Net cash flow/employee 
Capex/sales, R&D expenditures/sales 
Leslie and Oyer (2008) ROA: EBITDA/TA 
Cohn et al. (2014) Pre-interest ROS, Pre-interest ROA 
Pre-interest EVA 
 
Guo et al. (2011) used the profitability ratios EBITDA/sales and net cash flow/sales, where net 
cash flow was defined as the difference between EBITDA and capital expenditure. Kaplan 
(1989a), on the other hand, used net cash flow/sales, operating income/sales and net cash 
flow/total assets as proxies for operating performance. Like Guo et al (2011), the current study 
used the EBITDA/Sales ratio. However, for the sample used in this study there was a lack of 
consistent and reliable data with regards to capital expenditures, and thus net cash flows of PTP 
LBO firms, especially during the private period. As a result, EBIT/sales was used as the second 
operating performance measure in this study. However, most of this study was based on 
EBITDA/Sales and EBITDA/Total Assets. 
 
This dissertation uses EBITDA instead of net cash flows as the EBITDA does not take into 
account capital expenditures, which are a source of cash outflow in a company. In fact, some 
industries (such as energy, infrastructure or manufacturing) require higher capital expenditures 
compared to others (such as IT or services).  Therefore, EBITDA seems to be a better measure 
for purposes of comparing companies with often very different capital expenditure 
requirements. This was also the case with this present dissertation that had an “industry-
 49 
 
agnostic” approach without focusing on a single industry or market. Therefore EBITDA/sales 
and EBITDA/Total assets are deemed to be more suitable to compare the operating performance 
of companies across a broad range of industries. These ratios do not require any additional 
adjustments to account for capital expenditures and other expenses that are inherent to some 
specific industries.   
 
The return on sales was computed as follows: 
 
ROS1 =  
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴 
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠  
            (Equation 1)    
 
ROS2 =  
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇 
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠  
  (Equation 2) 
 
Where EBITDA is earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization, and EBIT is 
earnings before interest and tax.  
  
One way to estimate the change () in operating performance is to calculate the changes in 
ROS from T-1, the last financial year before LBO, to Tlast year, the exit/outcome date of the LBO.   
In this regard, the following formulae were used:  
 
 (ROS1) =  
ROS1 (T −1)
ROS1 (T last year)
  - 1                    (Equation 3) 
 
 (ROS2) =  
ROS2 (T −1)
ROS2 (T last year)
  - 1                    (Equation 4) 
 
Similarly, for Return on Assets (ROA), the same formulae involving EBITDA were used, but 
with Total Assets as the denominator, as follows:  
 
ROA =  
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠  
          (Equation 5) 
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As an alternative way to estimate the change () in operating performance, the changes in ROA 
from T-1, from the last financial year before LBO to Tlast year, the exit/outcome date of the LBO, 
were calculated using the following formula:  
 
 (ROA1) =  
𝑅𝑂𝐴1 (𝑇 −1)
𝑅𝑂𝐴1 (𝑇 𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟)
  - 1            (Equation 6)              
 
Using industry data based on matching SIC codes, the change () in ROS and ROA were 
adjusted for industry performance in order to allow for a better comparison in terms of operating 
performance of PTP LBOs. The following formulae were used to calculate the industry-
adjusted operating performance ratios. 
 
 Adjusted ROS1 =  ROS1 -  Industry ROS1 
= (ROSlast year/ROST-1 -1) – (ROS Indlast year/ROS IndT-1 -1)            (Equation 7) 
 
 Adjusted ROA =  ROA -  Industry ROA 
= (ROAlast year/ROAT-1 -1) – (ROA Indlast year/ ROA IndT-1 -1)         (Equation 8) 
 
As seen in the above formulae, industry median ROS and ROA ratios (and hence operating 
performance changes) were matched on a deal-by-deal basis to the duration of each individual 
deal’s holding period. The duration of a deal spans from the financial year preceding the buyout 
(T-1) and the last financial year before exit/deal outcome (Tlast year).   
 
The median industry ROS and ROA ratios were calculated annually for London Stock 
Exchange listed peer companies with the same four-digit SIC code. For each calculation, the 
data of all UK-listed peer companies (according to Capital IQ) were utilised to find matching 
ROS and ROA ratios for each industry per year, for each corresponding holding period. This 
resulted in 54 different industry medians being calculated and used for each of the three 
dependent variables used in the regressions. No industry peer year group consisted of less than 
ten companies, with many consisting of 40 or more companies.  
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It should also be noted that statistical tests carried out in previous studies tend to use exclusively 
the medians and not the means of each variable. This dissertation, therefore, followed the same 
method to test the research hypotheses as described in the following chapter.  
 
4.2. Method used to explain changes in operating performance  
 
As this study tests for possible correlations between operating performance changes and 
reduced agency costs as a result of improved management incentives, improved shareholder 
control and monitoring and the disciplining effects of debt, three OLS multivariate regression 
analyses, each one based on Equation 9, were applied to selected dependent and explanatory 
variables: 
Y = 0 + 1 x1 + 2x2 + … + n xn +        (Equation 9) 
 
Where, depending on the analysis done, Y is either ROS1,   Adjusted ROS1 or  Adjusted 
ROA, as defined above. 
 
The independent variables used, as well as the associated hypotheses, are shown in Table 14. 
Data relating to the independent variables was collected for the first financial year following 
the buyout. 
 
Table 14: Independent variables in the regression analysis 
 
Independent variable Hypothesis tested  
Management Equity Participation  H1  
Equity Holding of Management in % H1 
CEO Change H3 
CEO becomes Chairman H3 
Club PE H3 
ROS1 at T-1 Low performing companies in the pre-buyout 
period may have better operating performance after 
buyout 
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Log (Capital) Low performing firms (thus, smaller deals) in the 
pre-buyout period may have better operating 
performance after buyout 
Pre-buyout Leverage H2 
Leverage Change H2 
Log (Board size) H3 
Sponsor Director/Board Size  H3 
 
 
All collected data have been tested for normality to ensure that they are interpretable in an OLS 
regression. Some of the variables (Capital and Board Size) are log transformed to remove the 
deviance from normality.  
 
The relationship of the above variables to the operating performance of target PTP LBO firms 
are examined in the regression analyses presented in the next chapter. The following explains 
the logic behind each independent variable selected to test the various hypotheses.  
 
As described above, the management equity contribution (in % and as a yes/no question) 
assumes that the interests of management and shareholders are more aligned as the percentage 
of equity held by management increases (Kaplan, 1989a and Guo et al., 2011). According to 
this hypothesis, the higher management’s equity ownership is, the less the agency cost relating 
to the conflict of interests between shareholder and managers (agents) is. Thus, it is assumed 
that the interests of management will become more aligned with the increase of management 
incentives and rewards (e.g. higher salaries, higher management equity contribution etc.). Using 
binary outcomes, if the target company’s management participates in the deal as shareholders, 
then this variable is taken as a dummy variable equalling 1. If the management does not have 
any equity holding in the LBO firm, then this variable takes the value of 0.  
 
The variable “CEO change” assumes that the private equity firms are proactive shareholders 
and actively participate in the selection and monitoring of the management team of the 
companies they invest in (Acharya et al. 2009). Thus, according to Acharya et al. (2009), the 
CEO is replaced in 69% of deals after completion of the buyout.  Another independent variable 
of relevance to this hypothesis is the CEO becoming chairman. In some case, the CEO resigns 
to take over as chairman of the board, and in other cases the CEO retains this role and becomes 
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chairman. Guo et al. (2011) speculates that the latter scenario is an indication that the private 
equity investor assumes that replacing the pre-buyout management does not improve firm 
performance. Both of these two variables (i.e. CEO Change and CEO becomes Chairman) are 
taken as dummy variables, each one equalling 1 if the CEO is replaced and the CEO takes over 
the Chairman role, respectively.   
 
Similarly, the variable “sponsor director ratio” is used to control for the private equity 
involvement within the management of the target LBO firm as a means to ensure an efficient 
monitoring. Similarly, deals involving more than one private equity firm (i.e. Club PE) are 
tested from the perspective of shareholder monitoring hypothesis. Guo et al. (2011) assume that 
deals involving a Club PE structure may hinder the monitoring process. The “Club PE” variable 
is a dummy variable in the form of a “yes/no” question. If there is more than one private equity 
firm involved in the deal, then this variable takes the value of 1, otherwise it is considered 0.    
 
When it comes to test the “disciplining effect of debt” hypothesis, the pre-buyout leverage and 
leverage change are taken into consideration in the analysis. Increased debt may reduce agency 
costs as it has a disciplining effect on managers, who will adopt a more selective attitude when 
considering different investment projects (positive NPV projects). This is also called the Free 
Cash Flow Hypothesis. By reducing the amount of cash flow available, the management team 
will be more committed to pay the company’s debt and interest liabilities instead of engaging 
in a never-ending investment and diversification cycle called “empire building” by Jensen 
(1986).  This hypothesis is measured by examining the pre-buyout leverage (debt/EBITDA at 
T-1) and the leverage change between pre- and post-buyout period (measured as  Debt between 
T-1 and Tlast year, divided by EBITDA at T-1). Following the methodology of Guo et al. (2011), 
the pre-buyout leverage (and the leverage change) is calculated as Debt/EBITDA (and the 
corresponding  Debt/EBITDA for leverage change), instead of assigning the capital to the 
denominator. This is because capital is also inclusive of debt value.  
 
Finally, capital and ROS1 (that is, EBITDA/Sales) at T-1 are used to test whether the low-
performing companies in the pre-buyout period experience better operating performance 
improvements compared to other comparable PTP LBO firms. Thus, Guo et al. (2011) argue 
that firms with low pre-buyout performance and low transaction value present better prospects 
in terms of operating performance improvements.  
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4.3. Conclusion 
 
This dissertation follows the literature when it comes to measure the operating performance of 
target PTP LBO firms in the subsample. The metrics relating to operating performance of target 
LBO firms form the dependent variables of the regression analyses.  
 
A number of leverage and management data relating to target LBO firms are then used to test 
the underlying research hypotheses that are reduced agency costs, improved control and 
monitoring and the disciplining effect of debt, all three of which are anticipated to explain the 
operating performance changes of LBO target companies while under private ownership. The 
regression results are discussed in the next chapter.  
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5.  Results and Analysis 
 
This chapter describes the results of the analyses of operating performance changes for LBO 
target firms that completed going private transactions. Specifically, the changes in operating 
performance of PTP LBO firms, categorised according to the various deal outcomes observed, 
are compared in terms of median percentage changes from the last financial year before buyout 
to the financial year before exit/deal outcome. In the second section of this chapter, the results 
of the multivariate OLS regression analysis performed to detect the sources of operating 
performance changes that occur in PTP LBO firms during the post-buyout period, are discussed 
in terms of the different hypotheses presented in the previous chapters of this dissertation.  
 
5.1. Changes in Operating Performance  
 
In this section, the operating performance changes of LBO firms that went private between 
2003 and 2015 are analysed. Table 15 summarises the post-buyout operating performance 
changes of the 54 PTP deals with sufficient post-buyout information.  
 
It should be noted that the overall picture of public-to-private LBO transactions completed in 
the United Kingdom between 2003-2015 shows deteriorating operating performance. In fact, 
the subsample of 54 PTP LBO deals generates a median unadjusted change in EBITDA/Sales 
and EBITDA/Total Assets ratios of -2,87% and -22,01%, respectively. The median industry-
adjusted values of these ratios for the entire subsample are -8,64% and -6,71%, respectively.  
 
The best operating performance is generated by LBO firms that went public again. The outcome 
of these deals in terms of median EBITDA/Sales and EBITDA/Total Assets ratios are 25% and 
11% for unadjusted and industry-adjusted categories, respectively.  The deals that were exited 
via a secondary buyout by another private equity firm also mostly display negative values. The 
unadjusted and industry-adjusted EBITDA/Sales ratio of SBOs are 4,66% and -0,17%, 
respectively. On the other hand, the unadjusted and industry-adjusted EBITDA/Total Assets 
ratios of deals exited via an SBO are approximately 25% and 17%, respectively.   
 
With regards to deals that were sold to strategic investors, median ROS and ROA ratios are also 
negative, with unadjusted and industry-adjusted EBITDA/Sales ratios being close to -16% and 
-22%, respectively, whereas unadjusted and industry-adjusted ROA ratios are approximately    
-22% and 5,3%, respectively. Lastly, as expected, all performance ratios for distressed deals 
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are significantly negative, with unadjusted and industry-adjusted EBITDA/Sales ratios having 
median values of -100% and -64,90%, respectively, and unadjusted and industry-adjusted 
EBITDA/Total Assets ratios of -109,53% and -66,19%, respectively.  
 
The above results closely mirror the findings presented by Guo et al. (2011). The latter also 
find a negative operating performance for all 94 deals with sufficient post-buyout information 
in the US from 1990 to 2006, with unadjusted and industry-adjusted EBITDA/Sales ratios of   
-6,72% and -1,38%, respectively. In terms of return on assets (EBITDA/Total Assets), 
unadjusted and industry-adjusted values of -4,43% and 1,52% are calculated. Guo et al (2011) 
further similarly find that the best performing category in their sample are firms that went public 
again through a second IPO, and that deals exited via strategic sales or SBOs generate negative 
operating performance.  Kaplan (1989a), on the other hand, finds an improvement in the 
operating cash flow of MBOs completed between 1980 and 1986 in the US. However, unlike 
Guo et al. (2011), it should be noted that Kaplan does not look at the entire private ownership 
period. His study is limited to a time window of -1 to +2 years relative to deal closure.  
 
Opler (1992) uses a sample of 44 PTP LBOs completed in the US from 1985 to 1989 and finds 
an improvement of 16,5% in the operating cash flow/sales ratio. Kaplan (1989a) finds an 
increase by 11,9% for the same ratio in the first two years after buyout. In a similar manner, the 
study realised by Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990) show an improvement by 23,5% for 35 
reverse LBOs completed between 1976 and 1987 in the US.   
 
However, recent studies on the operating performance of private equity-sponsored PTP LBO 
firms yield somewhat mixed results. For instance, Ayash and Schütt (2016) study 183 PTP 
buyouts in the US by reproducing the same study as Guo et al. (2011) and Kaplan (1989a). 
After having slightly modified the accounting data used to measure operating performance, they 
find no improvements in the operating performance of PTP firms in the post-buyout period. As 
described above, the subsample studied in this dissertation presents some similarities with most 
recent research when it comes to the negative operating performance of target PTP LBO firms 
in the post-buyout period.  
 
In fact, in terms of EBITDA/Sales, the maximum value of change obtained in the subsample is 
in the order of 24%.  Other operating performance ratios measured in this present study are 
mostly negative. This observation can possibly be explained by the fact that the MBOs/LBOs 
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of the first wave generated higher cash flow gains compared to the wave of the 2000s and later, 
as the buyouts of the early 1980s involved mostly underperforming companies in need of 
additional cash flow to improve their operations. This may be the reason why LBOs in early 
1980s generated positive operating performance. Another explanation for this result could be 
related to potential selection bias. As described earlier, some of the major deals could not be 
included in the research subsample due to data scarcity. This is an important issue, as those 
deals were, most of the time, completed by some of the largest private equity firms globally 
(e.g. Blackstone). It is not possible to track the post-buyout financial data of those LBO firms 
acquired by private equity firms via an offshore company. In other words, the above results 
could be suffering from selection bias, as this could be the case with the similar negative results 
obtained by Guo et al. (2011). In fact, according to Kaplan and Strömberg (2009), the US-based 
firms are more affected by selection bias than other countries where data is more available. This 
is because information on private companies may not be always available in the US. For this 
reason, most of the studies realised in the US focus on reverse LBOs, in which companies go 
public again after going through an LBO structure. Moreover, databases such as Capital IQ, 
sometimes provide incomplete or missing information for earlier LBO deals, especially for 
those completed until mid-1990s (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009). Another important point is the 
fact that smaller deals may not be listed in large databases, such as Merger Market or Capital 
IQ, and even, if they are listed, most studies do not include them in their research sample. For 
instance, Guo et al. (2011) only study PTP LBO with deal values of at least US$100 million. 
Thus, the selection bias may have an effect on the negative results observed in some studies 
realised on LBOs.  
 
Finally, a third possible reason for the negative operating performance of the target LBO firms 
in the subsample could be that, after raising large amounts of debt, the target LBO firms are 
usually under pressure to pay off their creditors and meet their liabilities. For this reason, some 
LBO firms may limit capital expenditures and investments by deciding not to invest in positive 
NPV projects in order to be able to service their debt (Kaplan, 1989a; Kaplan and Strömberg, 
2009). As a result, cash flows may be negatively affected, and the operating performance may 
deteriorate.  
 
When it comes specifically to changes in return on assets, Weir et al. (2015) find a declining 
ROA for 138 PTP transactions in the UK from 1998 to 2004. However, Leslie and Oyer (2008), 
for 144 LBO deals from 1996 to 2004 in the US, find the change in adjusted EBITDA/Total 
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Assets to be statistically not significant. In this present study, both unadjusted and industry-
adjusted changes in return on assets are found to be negative for all deals and across various 
exit/deal outcomes, with the exception of deals that were exited via an IPO. Naturally, the first 
option of PE firms is to take the IPO path for firms whose operational profitability have 
improved, whilst those who deteriorated are more likely to be in distress or sold on. In fact, 
RLBOs generally outperform other IPOs and the entire stock market, as shown by Cao and 
Lerner (2006). Thus, it seems plausible that the private equity firms will re-IPO the best 
performing firms in their portfolio. This is even more important considering the fact that the 
private equity firms face a reputation risk if the re-IPO of the company ends up being a failure. 
Since their reputation is at stake, the private equity firms are expected to be very cautious when 
selecting their portfolio firms to be exited via an IPO process.  
 
As mentioned above, the change in ROA for IPO deals are positive, both for unadjusted and 
industry-adjusted data. This could be a result of operational downsizing as a result of the 
financial, governance and operational engineering brought by the private equity firm (Kaplan 
and Strömberg, 2009). On the same issue, Guo et al. (2011) argue that the increasing ROA in 
the post-buyout period may be a result of the sale of unproductive assets. Similarly, Guo et al. 
(2011) find negative values for all deals and across different exit categories, except for IPO and 
secondary LBOs.  
 
To sum up, the subsample in this dissertation shows a negative operating performance for PTP 
LBOs completed between 2003 and 2015 in the UK. Results are similar to those that were 
obtained in other recent research in the same field. Unfortunately, it was not possible to 
calculate financial returns generated by the PTP LBO deals in the research sample as data on 
terminal values and interim interest and dividends payments are in most cases not available. In 
theory, if this data could be obtained, this study can be further expanded by investigating and 
estimating the financial returns obtained by private equity firms in the same deals. One study 
which managed to obtain sufficient data to do this was conducted by Acharya et al. (2009), who 
did find significant returns.  This is an interesting result, since it shows that high return on 
capitals of private equity investors do not necessarily stem from the improvements in operating 
performance of PTP LBO firms.
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Table 15: Changes in Operating Performance from one financial year before buyout to the last financial year before exit/deal resolution 
This table present the changes in operating performance of the subsample with sufficient post-buyout information from T-1 prior to buyout to Tlast year  prior to 
exit. The subsample is then categorised according to different deal outcomes (IPO, Sold, SBO or Distressed). The performance ratios used are ROS1 
(EBITDA/Sales) and ROS2 (EBIT/Sales), as well as ROA (EBITDA/Total Assets), all expressed in %. The column “+Obs” indicates the number of deals with 
positive performance ratios. Two sets of data are provided: the unadjusted change denote the median change of ROS1, ROS2 and ROA from T-1 to Tlast year. The 
industry-adjusted change subtracts the median industry change ( Industry ROS1,  Industry ROS2 and  Industry ROA) based on the four-digit SIC code from 
the median ROS1,  ROS2 and ROA. Performance ratios of LBO firms were sourced from Companies House and Capital IQ, and industry data from Capital 
IQ. The table format is adapted from Guo et al. (2011). 
 
  (1) 
Subsample with post-
buyout info (54 PTPs) 
(2) 
IPO (13) 
(3) 
Sold (16) 
(4) 
SBO (17) 
(5) 
Distressed (8) 
 Performance Measure  △ + Obs. △ + Obs. △ + Obs. △ + Obs. △ + Obs. 
ROS1 Change in EBITDA/Sales               
 Unadjusted  -2,87% 26 24,67% 9 -15,76% 7 4,66% 9 -100,00% 1 
 Industry adjusted  -8,64% 24 24,44% 9 -21,77% 6 -0,17% 8 -64,60% 1 
ROS2 Change in EBIT/Sales               
 Unadjusted  -42,00% 14 -38,50% 6 -40,99% 4 -25,94% 4 -248,40% 0 
 Industry adjusted  -34,69% 19 -1,65% 6 -22,62% 7 -16,90% 6 -226,15% 0 
ROA Change in EBITDA/Total 
Assets 
              
 Unadjusted  -22,02% 16 10,60% 7 -22,02% 3 -24,83% 4 -109,53% 2 
 Industry adjusted  -6,71% 25 10,87% 8 5,29% 8 -16,97% 7 -66,19% 2 
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5.2. Descriptive statistics of proxy variables 
 
As introduced briefly in Chapters 3 and 4, a number of independent variables were chosen to 
test the hypotheses linking improved management incentives, the disciplining effect of debt and 
improved shareholder monitoring and governance, to improved operating performance. The 
following will provide an overview of the hypotheses tested and proxy variables used to test 
these hypotheses. For this purpose, the presence and distribution of each proxy variable within 
the research subsample will be described by referring to Table 16. The observations and 
findings presented in this dissertation will be mostly compared to those of Guo et al. (2011) and 
Kaplan (1989a), as well as other studies, when possible.   
 
 Improved management incentives: 
This hypothesis is measured by the percentage of shares owned by the management. In order 
to test this hypothesis, the number of PTP LBO deals involving the existing management team 
was determined by reading through deal offer documents. Thereafter, the exact percentage of 
equity holding by management was identified by referring to deal offer documents and annual 
reports. As shown in Table 16, the subsample with 54 PTP LBOs involves 35 deals (64,81%) 
with management equity participation. Out of these 35 deals, the average and median equity 
ownership of the management are 14,08% and 9,65%, respectively.    
 
These number are close to that of Guo et al. (2011), whose subsample contains 58 deals (out of 
94) with management equity participation, and average and median management equity 
holdings of 12,8% and 6,5%, respectively. Similarly, Acharya et al. (2009) find that the average 
equity ownership of management is 15% for a sample of 60 private equity buyouts that took 
place from 2000 to 2007 in the United Kingdom. On the other hand, in a study of 76 MBOs 
completed between 1980 and 1986, Kaplan (1989a) finds the management ownership have a 
mean and median value of 22% and 31% after the buyout. Kaplan’s findings are probably higher 
because his research sample consists of management buyouts. 
Management equity contribution seems to be an important characteristic of PTP LBO deals 
completed in the UK and the US, as shown by previous studies. Private equity firms usually 
aim to benefit from the operational expertise and know-how of the existing management team 
as a driver to improve operational performance of target LBO firms. Therefore, a significant 
number of private equity firms usually overcome the shareholder-agent conflict by increasing 
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the number of shares owned by management, and by contractually limiting the management 
discretion in decision-making processes.  
  
 Disciplining effects of debt: 
As presented in Table 16, the mean and median values of pre-buyout leverage of 54 PTP LBO 
deals were 1,96 and 2,06 respectively. Guo et al. (2011) find mean and median ratios of 2,58 
and 1,90, respectively.  
 
When it comes to leverage change, the mean and median values are 8,11 and 6,06, respectively. 
This increase is normal as PTP LBO deals are normally financed with large amounts of debt 
raised by private equity investors.  However, the leverage change found in this study is a little 
higher than the leverage change observed by, for example, Guo et al. (2011), who observe a 
leverage change with a mean value of 4,03 and a median value 3,70. This difference could stem 
from the way those PTP deals have been realised. It should be noted that the research sample 
of Guo et al. (2011) spans a larger time period, including all PTP LBOs from 1990 to 2005. 
However, as described by Kaplan and Strömberg (2009), the capital structure of deals in the 
1990s had a more conservative composition. In contrast, PTP deals completed between 2003 
and 2007, just before the global financial crisis, had a much riskier capital structure. This may 
be the reason why the leverage change found in this study is higher than the findings presented 
by Guo et al. (2011). This observation may be an indication that private equity firms, especially 
in the pre-2007 period, used increased debt as an instrument to improve the operating 
performance of PTP LBO firms. This observation may explain the underlying motivation of 
private equity firms to opt for highly leveraged capital structures. Consistent with the 
disciplining effects of debt hypothesis, private equity firms aim to exert a better control upon 
the management team by increasing the leverage ratio of the companies in which they invest. 
 
 Improved Shareholder Monitoring and Governance: 
This hypothesis assumes that the private equity firm brings with it operational and financial 
expertise and applies governance principles to the firms it invests in (Kaplan and Strömberg, 
2009). In order to test this hypothesis, several independent variables are used. Firstly, the PTP 
LBOs that involve two or more private equity firms are identified. This variable is named “Club 
PE” in Table 16. As seen below, the number of deals that could be defined as Club PE deals is 
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17. This number represents 31,48% of the subsample with post-buyout information. The next 
two variables used to test this hypothesis are the board size, and the sponsor director ratio (the 
percentage of directors that represent the private equity firm). For the sample used, the average 
and median board sizes are 6,26 and 6,0 respectively, while the sponsor director ratio is 0,37 
(mean) and 0,33 (median). 
 
Moreover, the CEO is replaced in 18 deals, representing approximately 33% of the deals in the 
subsample. Similarly, Guo et al. (2011) find a management change in 37,2% of the deals they 
observe in their subsample of 94 LBO firms. This means that approximately one third of private 
equity firms build a new management team and tend to replace the CEO in the first year after 
buyout completion in order to better control the target firm operations. This is mostly the case 
when the management is not part of the deal. On the other hand, the CEO or the management 
team are usually not replaced when the deal involves management as shareholder (i.e. MBO). 
Sometimes, even if the deal is not an MBO, the private equity firm retains the existing 
management team in a significant number of transactions. This might indicate that the conflict 
shareholder-agent is not perceived always as a major risk to the operational performance of 
target LBO firm. Sometimes, knowledge and expertise of the management team as a driver of 
operational performance in target LBO firm are more important to private equity firms.   
 
As for the deals where the CEO becomes chairman, the subsample in this dissertation shows 
only 6 deals, representing approximately 11% of the subsample.  This observation is interesting 
as Guo et al. (2011) identify 48 deals where the CEO becomes chairman. This figure represents 
51.1% of their subsample of 94 PTP LBO deals. The observation in this dissertation is much 
lower than that of Guo et al. (2011). In fact, this difference between both studies could be 
explained by the underlying perceptions and motivations of private equity investors with regard 
to management incentives. In other words, private equity investors in the sample of Guo et al. 
(2011) seem to be unconcerned by a “strong CEO” within the management of the target firm. 
In other words, it could be that the private equity firms in the US do not believe that a CEO 
under strict control of the private equity investor will have a positive effect on improving the 
target firm’s operating performance. This observation might be an indication that US private 
equity firms do not believe in increased shareholder monitoring by way of imposing strict 
contractual limits to the CEO position when it comes to take important decisions about the 
future of the target firm.    
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 Pre-buyout Firm Performance  
As Guo et al. (2011) is of the view that firms with low performance during the pre-buyout 
period outperform their peers that went through a PTP LBO process, ROS1 (that is, 
EBITDA/Sales) at T-1 and log (Capital) are used to test this hypothesis. In fact, Guo et al. (2011) 
think that underperforming companies respond better to an LBO structure by making a better 
use of cash and debt resources brought by the private equity firm, along with its operational and 
managerial expertise. According to this hypothesis, underperforming companies in the pre-
buyout period show higher operating performance improvements compared to other 
comparable PTP LBO firms. 
 
Table 16: Summary of Proxy Variables of the Subsample with Post-buyout Information 
This table presents a general overview of various variable data measured across the 54 PTP deals making 
up the subsample. Definitions of the variables have been provided above. The table format is adapted 
from Guo et al. (2011). 
 
Panel A: Distribution of various deal characteristics across the subsample  
(dummy variables) 
  
  Number of deals % of deals   
Management Equity Participation 35 64,81%  
Club PE  17 31,48%  
CEO Change 18 33,33%  
Post LBO, CEO is Chairman of the Board 6 11,11%  
   
 
 
Panel B: Mean and median values of different variables across 54 PTP deals 
(continuous variables) 
  
 Number of observations Mean Median 
Management Equity %  35 14,08% 9,65% 
Pre-buyout leverage (total debt/EBITDA) 54 1,96 2,06 
Leverage change  53 8,11 6,06 
Board size 52 6,26 6 
Sponsor director ratio 52 0,37 0,33 
Capital (£ million) 54 647,54 218,82 
EBITDA/Capital 54 0,10 0,10 
Duration/Holding Period in years 54 5,72 5 
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5.3. Factors Correlated with Post-buyout Operating Performance 
As can be seen in Table 17, which presents the results of the regression analysis, there are a few 
independent variables that have an effect on the post-buyout operating performance of PTP 
LBOs in the regression subsample of 52 firms with sufficient post-buyout data. Note that for 
the regression analysis a further two deals had to be removed from the original sample of 54, 
as their board size and sponsor director numbers did not match.  
 
 Regression model with Return on Sales at last year as dependent variable 
The first regression is conducted on the return on sales (EBITDA/Sales) at last year as 
dependent variable.  The adjusted coefficient of determination (or the adjusted R2) of the model 
is 0,39, which indicates that around 39% of the variation in the dependent variable (i.e. the ROS 
at last year for the first regression) can be explained by the independent variables.  
 
The first statistically significant variable in explaining return on sales at last year is the industry-
adjusted return on sales of the LBO target firm one year before buyout (T-1), which has a 
positive coefficient and is statistically significant at the 1% level. In other words, the industry-
adjusted return on sales of the company one year before going private is positively correlated 
with the return on sales obtained at last year before the end of private equity ownership. In other 
words, a company’s return on sales at buyout date (or one year preceding the buyout) seems to 
have a direct effect on the last return on sales before exit. This finding is actually the contrary 
of what was implied by the hypothesis of Guo et al. (2011) with regard to better performance 
of LBO firms that had a low operating performance in the pre-buyout period. In other words, 
companies that perform well in the pre-buyout period seem to generate a relatively good return 
on sales during the private equity ownership. This observation may also indicate that private 
equity firms tend to select the high-performing companies as desirable LBO targets and invest 
in them to further improve their operational performance and bottom-line profitability.   
 
The second statistically significant variable is the level of pre-buyout leverage, which is 
similarly statistically significant at the 1% level, and has a negative sign. This means that as the 
pre-buyout leverage increases, the operating performance measured as ROS (EBITDA/Sales) 
at last year diminishes. On the other hand, the third and last statistically significant variable at 
the 1% level is the leverage change. This variable has a positive sign. In other words, as the 
leverage change increases, the operating performance of the firm in the post-buyout period also 
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increases. This result shows that the free cash flow or the disciplining effect of debt hypothesis 
must be interpreted with caution. While the leverage change could be one of the factors that 
could explain operating performance improvements, a high level of pre-buyout leverage may 
indicate a deterioration of the operating performance of target PTP LBO firms. In other words, 
target LBO firms with a high leverage ratio in the pre-buyout period may have a declining 
return on sales in the post-buyout period.  
 
Guo et al. (2011) similarly find that the target company's pre-buyout leverage and changes in 
leverage are both statistically significant, and thus can be seen as effective predictors of the 
return on sales of the PTP LBO firm at last year before exit. It should be noted, however, that 
in the study of Guo et al. (2011), the pre-buyout leverage has a positive relationship with return 
on sales at the last year of private ownership as opposed to negative sign found in this present 
study. In contrast to the findings in this dissertation, the findings of Guo et al. (2011) suggest 
that target firms with a high level of debt in the pre-buyout period still perform well after the 
buyout.  
 
Unlike Guo et al. (2011), however, this study does not find that management changes, the CEO 
of the target company becoming chairman, and return on sales of the industry in the last year 
before target company exit as statistically significant variables. This is actually an interesting 
finding as shareholder-monitoring hypothesis as a driver of operating performance does not 
seem to be validated in the first regression analysis presented in this dissertation. Similarly, the 
industry performance does not seem to have an effect on the operating performance changes of 
target firms.  
 
The regression results of this dissertation bear mostly the same signs as those presented by Guo 
et al. (2011) on the same or similar variables. There is one exception, however: the findings of 
Guo et al. (2011) suggest a negative relationship (although not statistically significant) between 
the sponsor director ratio and the dependent variable, ROS at last year. In this dissertation, the 
sponsor director is insignificant and positive, suggesting that as the number seats held by the 
private equity firm in the board of directors increases, the operating performance of the target 
LBO firm show positive changes. Thus, an increase in the sponsor director ratio could be 
reflected as operating performance improvement, as a result of a more efficient shareholder 
monitoring by private equity firm(s). This finding is consistent with the shareholder-monitoring 
hypothesis which suggest that the private equity firms actively participate to the management 
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of the companies they invest in by exerting an increased control over the operations of the 
management and by restructuring the governance structure of the company. Having said that, 
one would expect to see that the sponsor director ratio had a more significant effect on the 
operating performance of the company, which is not the case in this research. The positive 
effect of the presence of sponsor directors within the board of directors on operational 
improvements of target LBO firms remains somewhat weak.   
 
 Regression model with Change () in Return on Sales (EBITDA/Sales) from   T-1 
to Tlast year as dependent variable: 
The adjusted R2 of the model in this case is 0,54. As observed in the previous model, the sign 
of leverage change is positive and statistically significant at the level of 1%. Thus, the leverage 
change has a positive relationship with the change in return on sales from T-1 to Tlast year. This 
finding seems to validate the hypothesis relating to free cash flow/disciplining effect of debt. 
The higher is the leverage change, the better is the operating performance.  
 
In addition, the sign of the log (Capital) is negative in the model, and statistically significant at 
the 10% level. A negative coefficient for log (Capital) seems to validate the hypothesis of Guo 
et al. (2011) with regard to the superior operating performance of previously underperforming 
(and therefore, undervalued) companies in the post-buyout period. Guo et al. (2011) claim that 
an underperforming company in the pre-buyout period with a smaller capital (i.e. transaction 
value) usually outperforms its peers and shows a significantly higher operating performance. 
Underperforming companies usually have a cash flow requirement to efficiently keep up with 
their competitors and get ahead of them. In many cases, an investment by a private equity firm 
provides the necessary cash resources that help the target firms improve their operating 
performance. Having said that, the ROS at T-1, which is another variable used to test the 
aforementioned hypothesis, is positive but not significant, unlike the log (Capital) variable, 
which is negative. So, this finding must be taken cautiously. This could indicate that smaller 
deals that do not necessarily involve underperforming companies perform better. The 
underlying reason for this finding needs to be investigated further.     
 
This regression analysis does not show other significant variables. On the other hand, Guo et 
al. (2011) find that the variables including management change and CEO becomes Chairman 
are positive and significant, suggesting that the shareholder monitoring by the private equity 
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firm generates operating performance gains for the target PTP LBO firm when the CEO is 
replaced or becomes Chairman. In this dissertation, the change in operating performance has a 
negative correlation (but not significant) with the variable called “CEO becomes Chairman”. 
In other words, in a situation where the CEO takes over the Chairman role without resigning 
from his/her former role, the operating performance of the target LBO firm declines. This may 
indicate that the monitoring ability of the private equity firm could be reduced when the CEO 
significantly increase his/her control over the operations of the target LBO firm by taking over 
the Chairman role (Guo et al., 2011).     
 
Although not significant in this regression analysis, the “Club PE” variable is negative, 
suggesting that the operating performance of a target LBO firm declines as the number of 
private equity investors increase. In other words, the monitoring ability of private equity firms 
loses its importance as the number of private equity firms increases. Guo et al. (2011) find a 
positive but insignificant result on this, suggesting that a higher number of private equity firms 
improves monitoring ability, although their initial hypothesis anticipated the opposite outcome.  
 
Unlike the findings of Guo et al. (2011), the findings in this dissertation with regard to “Club 
PE” variable is consistent with the shareholder monitoring hypothesis suggesting that a higher 
number of private equity firms involved in a deal may bring along a dispersed shareholding 
structure, which is actually deemed to be one of the main challenges encountered in public 
corporations. In fact, as described by Jensen and Meckling (1976), a dispersed ownership may 
hinder the decision-making process and the value creation mechanisms within a company. In 
other words, a higher number of shareholders creates “too much noise” in the management of 
the firm operations, especially when the interests of different shareholders clash with each 
other.  
 
Moreover, this conflict of interest may become even more pronounced, considering also the 
agency problem related to management actions. This may inevitably create a situation where 
the shareholders lose their monitoring ability and management becomes too independent in 
their actions, which would allow them to take self-serving corporate decisions.  
 
 
 
 
 68 
 
 Regression model with Change () in Return on Assets (EBITDA/Total Assets) 
from T-1 to Tlast year as dependent variable 
The dependent variable in this third model is the change in return on assets (ROA) as measured 
by  EBITDA/Total Assets from T-1 to Tlast year. The adjusted R2 is 0,14, which is close to the 
adjusted R2  0,10 as presented by Guo et al. (2011) in the corresponding regression model in 
their study.  
 
As observed in the two previous regression analyses, leverage change is positively and 
statistically significantly associated with  EBITDA/Total Assets at the 5% level. Thus, higher 
leverage changes seem to have a positive effect in the operating processes and asset profitability 
of the PTP LBOs. This finding may be explained by the disciplining effect of debt, which 
encourages the target PTP LBO firm to improve its asset profitability as a result of a more 
efficient deployment of resources and assets. Moreover, a higher leverage may allow PTP LBO 
firms to engage in maintenance expenditures that were postponed in the pre-buyout period 
(Kaplan, 1989a). Similarly, companies may invest in new equipment and machinery as cash 
becomes more available after raising debt. All these factors may increase the return on assets 
of target companies. However, this result has to be interpreted with caution, as the free cash 
flow hypothesis suggests that the priority is debt servicing, rather than engaging in capital 
expenditure projects. Moreover, it should be noted that the pre-buyout leverage in this 
regression bears a negative sign, although insignificant, as was the case with the first regression 
analysis. This may suggest that a high debt level in the pre-buyout period could reduce the asset 
profitability by increasing the cash-flow pressure on the target firm.   
 
It is further found that management equity participation is a relatively significant variable in 
the regression. In other words, the equity contribution of the management seems to be 
associated with a positive change in the return on assets. This might be a sign of more aligned 
management incentives and reduced agency costs in the LBO firm. As a result of the alignment 
of interest between management and shareholders, managers may start to be more selective 
when considering investment projects (Jensen, 1986), and also start selling unproductive assets 
and even divest entire divisions. In line with this, managers would typically start to invest in 
NPV positive assets, which should reflect as a positive change in the return on assets ratio of 
PTP LBO firms (Guo et al., 2011).   
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Although not significant, the variables including CEO change, CEO becomes Chairman, Club 
PE and Sponsor Director ratio are all negative. These findings suggest that these variables have 
an inverse effect on the asset profitability of target PTP LBO firms. The negative coefficient of 
“Club PE” is an anticipated element of this regression analysis, as a higher number of private 
equity firms as shareholders may cause a negative effect in the operating performance of the 
target LBO firm due to the dispersed ownership structure.    
 
The regression yields a negative coefficient for the “CEO change” and “CEO becomes 
Chairman” variables, suggesting that the change in ROA becomes negative when either of these 
variables is realised. A negative coefficient is an expected outcome for “CEO becomes 
Chairman”, as a very strong CEO may hinder the operating performance of the target LBO firm 
by reducing the monitoring ability of private equity firm as shareholder. On the other hand, the 
negative result for the CEO change is not consistent with the shareholder-monitoring 
hypothesis, as a newly-appointed CEO would increase the monitoring of the private equity firm 
and hence, improve the operating performance of target firm.   
 
On the other hand, the coefficients of the variable sponsor-to-director ratio are unexpectedly 
negative in this third regression analysis. This finding suggests that an increase in number of 
seats held by private equity firms decreases the operating performance of the firm. This is not 
consistent with the theory. In fact, one would expect that the contrary of this finding as the 
monitoring ability of the private equity firm would increase as they appoint more directors 
involved with the operations of the firm. On the other hand, this finding may also indicate that 
LBO firms with “problematic” financial and operational prospects may need a higher number 
of PE firm representatives involved with company operations (Guo et al., 2011).  
 
These results differ from those of Guo et al. (2011), who find a positive and significant 
relationship between the variables, including Club PE, management change and CEO becomes 
Chairman. The fact that Guo et al. (2011) find that operating performance improves when the 
number of private equity firms involved in the deal increase is not consistent with the theory of 
shareholder-monitoring as described above.  
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Table 17: OLS Regressions for post-buyout operating performance in PTP LBOs 
The table below presents the results of the three regression analyses conducted on three distinct 
dependent variables, namely return on sales (EBITDA/sales) at last year before the end of private equity 
ownership (ROS at last year), change in adjusted ROS (change in adjusted return on sales as measured 
as EBITDA/sales from one financial year before buyout and last financial year before exit), and change 
in adjusted ROA (EBITDA/total assets) T-1 to Tlast year. The change in return on sales and the return on 
assets is adjusted for the industry performance for the period of the private equity ownership of the LBO 
target company.  Capital (i.e. transaction value) and board size are log-transformed. Pre-buyout leverage 
is defined as debt/EBITDA at T-1. The leverage change between pre- and post-buyout period is measured 
by change () of debt between T-1 and Tlast year divided by EBITDA at T-1. Other independent variables 
have already been described in detail above. P-values are in brackets. Significant coefficients are 
indicated in bold. ***, **, * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
 
 
ROS at last 
year 
Change in adjusted 
ROS 
Change in adjusted 
ROA 
    
Log (Capital) -0,04 -0,88* -0,05 
 (0,3) (0,06) (0,92) 
Adjusted ROS (ROA) at year -1 0,93*** 0,24 -3,01 
 (4,47E-06) (0,90) (0,35) 
Industry ROS (ROA) at last year -0,36   
 (0,19)   
Management equity participation 0,08 0,18 1,25* 
 (0,13) (0,74) (0,07) 
Management equity % -0,24 0,23 -0,83 
 (0,11) (0,88) (0,65) 
Pre-buyout leverage -0,02*** 0,01 -0,03 
 (0,002) (0,89) (0,72) 
Leverage Change 0,003*** 0,08*** 0,035** 
 (0,008) (1,57E-07) (0,04) 
CEO change -0,01 0,28 -0,06 
 (0,76) (0,56) (0,91) 
CEO becomes chairman 0 -0,06 -0,43 
 (0,97) (0,92) (0,55) 
log (Board size) 0,05 0,68 -0,2 
 (0,63) (0,57) (0,88) 
Sponsor director ratio 0,05 0,4 -0,38 
 (0,49) (0,63) (0,70) 
Club PE 0,02 -0,24 -0,07 
 (0,65) (0,62) (0,89) 
Intercept (constant) 0,25 0,6 -0,09 
 (0,05) (0,63) (0,94 
    
Number of observations 52 52 52 
R2 0,54 0,64 0,32 
Adjusted R2  0,39 0,54 0,14 
Significance F 0,000712 3,85983E-06 0,09 
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5.4. Conclusion 
 
The main finding of this study is that, for LBO transactions completed in the United Kingdom 
between 2003 and 2015 and exited by 2018, the overall change in operating performance 
change was, on average, negative. Of these, the best performing companies were the ones that 
went public again to facilitate exit by their private equity investors. 
 
Consistent with the findings of Guo et al. (2011), Kaplan (1989a, 1989b) and others, changes 
in leverage of the target company between the LBO and the exit of the private equity investors, 
are positively correlated with changes in operating performance. In other words, the hypothesis 
relating to the disciplining effect of debt and free cash flow theory seems to be validated, as the 
leverage change is positively correlated with gains in operating performance. The implied 
“benefits of debt” finding is also consistent with the hypothesis that an increased tax shields as 
a result of interest expense deductibility is a driver of improved LBO target operating 
performance.  
 
In contrast, management changes and management equity participation seem to have little to 
no correlation with operating performance changes of PTP LBO firms. According to this result, 
increased management incentives and reduced agency problems do not seem to have a jointly 
significant effect on the operational performance improvement of target LBO firms.  In other 
words, the hypothesis suggesting that improved management incentives are positively 
correlated with operating performance is not validated.   
 
Similarly, the regression analyses failed to demonstrate any significant link between 
shareholder control and monitoring, as well as corporate governance principles, on the 
operating performance gains of PTP LBO firms. In other words, the regression analysis failed 
to demonstrate the hypothesis suggesting that private equity firms improve operational 
performance of target LBO firms by restructuring their governance structure and by exerting 
increased control upon the management activities and corporate decisions.  
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6.  Conclusion 
 
This study investigated public-to-private leveraged buyouts that were completed in the United 
Kingdom from 2003 to 2015. All deals that reached an outcome in the form of an exit deal (e.g. 
IPO, SBO, strategic sale) or other deal resolution (e.g. insolvency) was included in the sample. 
In addition, the research sample included only deals that were backed by one or more private 
equity firm, both with and without a management contribution to the equity of the target firm. 
The full sample comprised of 65 deals, whereas the subsample with sufficient post-buyout data 
contained 54 deals. Most of the analyses focused on the subsample with post-buyout data.   
 
The main theoretical framework for this study was the shareholder-related agency costs theory, 
which focuses mainly on three hypotheses to explain operating performance improvements 
resulting from a going-private LBO structure. These three hypotheses were improved 
management incentives, the free cash flow/disciplining effect of debt, and improved 
shareholder monitoring and control. The primary goal of this study was to test these three 
hypotheses as potential determinants of operating performance gains in PTP LBOs.   
 
When it comes to the sample characteristics, deals examined, especially in the pre-2007 period, 
had riskier capital structure and were highly levered, compared to the deals after the 2008-2009 
financial crisis. In fact, the capital structure of deals examined in this dissertation were similar 
to that of the deals completed in the first wave of PTP LBOs in the 1980s, that were 
characterised by high leverage (Kaplan, 1989a). Furthermore, nearly 15% of the LBO target 
companies in the subsample went either insolvent or were taken over by lenders. This 
phenomenon seems to be a direct result of risky capital structures characterising the PTP LBOs 
in the period of study.    
 
With regards to the operating performance of the PTP LBOs, the overall picture in terms of 
return on sales (measured as EBITDA/Sales) and return on assets (EBITDA/Total Assets) was 
negative. In other words, the majority of going-private LBOs completed in the timespan of this 
study did not result in operating performance improvements. Thus, the only companies with 
positive post-buyout performance were the ones that went public again after the exit of the 
private equity firm. This is an expected result as private equity firms will naturally choose to 
re-list the best-performing companies in their portfolio to enhance their returns and increase 
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their reputation in their industry. In this regard, sample selection bias come into play as only 
realised investments were part of the research subsample. For example, it is expected that other 
LBO firms remain still private if they have not yet reached their optimal performance that will 
allow a safe exit for the private equity firm. In addition, the research did not include some LBO 
firms that were acquired by an offshore structure based in tax haven countries. Having said that, 
the subsample included a fair number of distressed firms compared to other studies. To sum up, 
one must cautiously interpret the operating performance changes of target LBO firms because 
of potential selection bias. Unfortunately, most studies on value creation of LBOs inevitably 
suffer from the aforementioned bias at some extent.  
 
Considering the high rate of distressed firms, coupled with negative operating performance, it 
can be argued that the PTP LBOs examined in this dissertation failed to create value. However, 
this study only considered operating performance, and mainly due to a lack of data availability, 
not measured such as return on capital or the internal rate of return (IRR) obtained by private 
equity firms through their investments in the chosen LBO firms.  
 
In order to test the effect of the main hypotheses investigated in this study, three regression 
analyses, comprising a number of independent variables that could be related to the hypotheses 
of improved management incentives, the disciplining effect of debt/benefits of debt, and 
improved shareholder monitoring, were conducted. The dependent variables for each regression 
analysis were as follows: Return on sales (EBITDA/Sales) at last year before exit, Industry-
adjusted Change in Return on sales and Industry-adjusted Change in Return on assets 
(EBITDA/Total Assets), from one financial year before buyout to the last financial year before 
exit (from T-1 to Tlast year).  
 
The main finding of the regression analyses was the positive effect of a leverage change on 
operating performance. In all three of the models, the operating performance seemed to increase 
as leverage increased. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that increased debt in an 
LBO scenario results in a more focused and disciplined management, and thus improved 
operating performance.  
 
In addition, the industry adjusted ROS at T-1 was found to be positively correlated with the ROS 
at last year in the first regression model. On the other hand, no statistically significant evidence 
was found with regard to the hypothesis of Guo et al. (2011) that underperforming firms in the 
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pre-buyout period deliver a superior operating performance, or that a greater equity contribution 
by management results in better operating performance.   
 
This study’s finding that the PTP LBOs completed from 2003 to 2015 in one of the world’s 
most-developed LBO markets did not generate positive operating performance, calls into 
question the motivations of companies to go through a going-private LBO deal with the 
financial backing of private equity firms. In fact, the results found imply that LBOs might not 
generate real value beyond the gambling effect of the additional leverage taken on. In fact, it is 
undeniable that private equity firms who planned on “investing” in a specific industry usually 
meant “gambling” and “making speculative investments” given the high leverage risk 
associated with the recent deals concluded, especially, during in the pre-financial crisis era.  
 
This study could also be extended to measure return on capital and internal rate of return (IRR), 
if the required data could be obtained. In addition, it would be useful to analyse the valuation 
multiples at entry and exit (terminal values) of PTP LBO firms. As indicated, however, future 
research on this topic will have to overcome severe challenges relating to data collection.   
 
In terms of monitoring and control hypothesis, the research could be expanded to other 
stakeholders (e.g. banks as debt providers) instead of focusing only on the shareholder-control 
hypothesis. Moreover, future research could focus on different geographic markets such as 
continental Europe or emerging markets, where there is a significant lack of research on PTP 
LBOs and their value creation mechanisms.  Cross-country or industry comparisons could be 
very interesting research topics, but again the main challenge is that of LBO and private firm 
data availability.  
 
Last but not least, other possible performance measures can be included in future research. 
Employee-related productivity or plant-based productivity are amongst some of the interesting 
topics that could add value to the existing literature in public-to-private leveraged buyouts.     
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Industry Distribution (based on SIC codes) of the Subsample of 54 PTP 
LBOs with sufficient post-buyout data.  
Primary Industry  Number of Firms 
Energy 2 
Materials 2 
Industrials 13 
Utilities 2 
Financials 5 
Real Estate 1 
Healthcare 3 
Consumer Discretionary 15 
Information Technologies 7 
Communication Services 4 
Total 54 
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Appendix 2: A summary list of the PTP LBO deals in the subsample with sufficient post-buyout data (54 deals) 
 
Transactions 
Announced 
Type of 
Exit 
Target Firm Target - 
Total Sales 
(£GBPm) 
 
At T-1 
Target - 
EBITDA 
(£GBPm) 
 
At T-1 
Target - EBIT 
(£GBPm) 
 
At T-1 
Targe Total 
Assets 
(£GBPm) 
 
At T-1 
Target - Total 
Sales 
(£GBPm) 
 
At Tlast year 
Target -  
EBITDA 
(£GBPm) 
 
At Tlast year 
Target-  
EBIT 
(£GBPm) 
 
At Tlast year 
Target - Total 
Assets 
(£GBPm) 
 
At Tlast year 
04/03/2003 IPO PizzaExpress 
Limited 
221,9 44,55 23,0 199,0 255 62 51 294 
04/10/2003 SBO Fleets Point 
Limited 
224,22 54,69 28,67 462,96 401 95 40,1 909 
06/09/2003 Sold FCC Recycling 
(UK) Limited 
302,53 84,9 21,62 754,72 498 100 19,6 957 
07/31/2003 Sold Macdonald Hotels 
and Resorts Limited 
91 19 25,79 222,46 154 21 11 440 
08/21/2003 IPO Safestore Holdings 
plc (LSE:SAFE) 
7,22 0,372 -1,1 39,44 75 41,5 41 723 
09/22/2003 Distressed Stirling Group PLC 167,97 8,5 5,9 55,41 0 -3 -3,8 48 
12/11/2003 Distressed Jarvis Hotels 
Limited 
160,7 24,3 11,83 319,58 119  -13 187 
12/17/2003 IPO Debenhams plc 
(LSE:DEB) 
1.810,2 254,7 172,0 1.294,0 1708 314,7 223,6 1862 
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02/13/2004 SBO New Look Group 
Limited 
679,3 116,2 87,35 276,1 1415 212 148 1261 
10/27/2004 SBO South Staffordshire 
Plc 
68,66 32,59 20,86 164,25 120 44 27 60 
11/12/2004 Distressed Countryside 
Properties 
(Holdings) Limited 
330,07 29,22 20,0 423,33 164 -18,6 -19 471 
02/03/2005 SBO Vita (Holdings) 
Limited 
959 50 43 694 598 35 20 186 
03/11/2005 Distressed Trio Holdings 
Limited 
32 1 1 16,5 57,6 6,7 -7,2 39 
03/16/2005 Sold EIGL Limited 322,86 26,4 5,45 931,18 343 7,2 38 1000 
04/08/2005 Sold East Surrey 
Holdings Limited 
108,95 35,65 21,71 533,57 102 23 8,9 363 
05/06/2005 Sold LA Fitness Limited 82,68 20,14 12,79 121,87 57,5 19 -41 63 
07/07/2005 SBO PHS Group Limited 187,72 66,02 54,64 534,85 418,4 112,9 88,5 1541,2 
07/18/2005 IPO Telecity Group plc 27,99 2,46 (3,62) 49,65 97,9 23,4 4,8 227,3 
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08/27/2005 Sold PGL Realisations 
plc 
563,23 70,51 43,02 328,89 526 77,1 27,7 559 
09/08/2005 SBO Novus Leisure Ltd 78,36 17,53 10,92 86,35 95 7 -0,6 89 
12/19/2005 IPO Rift & Co Limited 44,91 7,22 4,38 44,64 112,3 12,3 6,2 61,6 
03/13/2006 IPO Nielsen Holdings 
plc (NYSE:NLSN) 
2.473,39 461,15 290,05 6.205,03 3268 759,6 507 9241 
03/17/2006 Sold Parkdean Holidays 
Limited 
84,19 20,54 14,55 162,76 142,5 33,7 19,7 314 
03/29/2006 SBO Associated British 
Ports Holdings 
Limited 
434,9 203,4 172,0 1.700,8 519 302,1 256,5 3428 
04/25/2006 Sold PrecisionIR Group, 
Inc. 
17,79 1,9 (1,57) 14,98 7,2 0,08 -0,4 4,5 
05/25/2006 Sold Mayborn Group 
Limited 
87,2 13,25 11,23 67,08 130 25 16,9 164 
07/06/2006 IPO DX Services 
Limited 
128,9 33,4 23,7 127,2 305,5 29,7 25 267,9 
07/17/2006 IPO McCarthy & Stone 
Retirement 
Lifestyles Limited 
325,7 117,4 115,6 656,8 485,7 96,3 93,2 762,3 
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09/07/2006 Sold CEB Talent 
Assessment 
69,2 9,9 7,8 44,7 93,1 35,4 9,6 170,8 
09/21/2006 Sold Incisive Media 
Limited 
66,4 16,51 13,51 166,49 52 5 -9,5 64 
09/28/2006 Sold Planit Holdings 
Limited 
32,05 4,62 2,56 38,62 28,5 6,2 3 39,1 
10/06/2006 SBO Gondola Group 
Limited 
404,4 88,4 71,2 603,5 204,9 27,5 -19,7 887,3 
03/08/2007 IPO Crest Nicholson 
PLC 
690,7 99,6 98,8 841,1 408 36,3 35,1 734 
03/16/2007 SBO Computer Software 
Group Limited 
33,57 7,54 3,61 61,34 31,77 23,3 25,3 81,4 
03/23/2007 Sold Enterprise Group 
Holdings Limited 
566,3 34,0 30,7 347,2 926,2 34,7 2,6 1101 
05/21/2007 Distressed Maltby Capital 
Limited 
1.808,3 (74,8) (143,7) 1.498,5 1651 310 174 6468 
06/13/2007 SBO Oasis Healthcare 
Limited 
89,96 9,44 6,66 68,4 148 19 1,9 165,8 
07/17/2007 IPO Premier Asset 
Management 
Limited 
18,82 1,66 0,6 30,18 35,7 8 0,7 35,2 
 84 
 
12/13/2007 Sold Environmental 
Scientifics Group 
Holdings Limited 
194,74 17,86 7,59 226,41 89 8,2 4,8 185 
12/19/2007 SBO Abbot Group 
Limited 
723,88 108,7 64,08 1.134,94 1584 310 -471 3285 
01/24/2008 Distressed Biffa Group 
Limited 
742,7 154,8 93,1 1.250,1 775,1 129,9 13,3 2125 
03/20/2008 Distressed Premier Research 
Group Ltd 
61,9 7,92 4,79 85,12 84 5,5 -85 21 
03/28/2008 SBO Civica Group 
Limited 
126,91 20,95 10,86 207,75 202 34,9 13,5 4446 
07/04/2008 IPO Nord Anglia 
Education Limited 
76,46 11,71 9,16 52,7 195 40 28 683 
07/23/2008 SBO SSP Holdings 
Limited 
64,41 15,79 13,99 122,04 77 20 9,7 42 
09/25/2009 IPO Just Retirement 
(Holdings) Limited 
312,6 48,9 48,4 3.089,1 965,2 217,1 217,1 9676 
06/02/2010 Sold Trafficmaster Ltd. 57,47 9,47 6,33 83,02 57 5,4 -6,7 99,1 
06/15/2010 SBO EnServe Group 
Limited 
310,7 38,5 29,0 362,2 200,6 1,4 -0,8 134,7 
07/19/2010 SBO Gates Industrial 
Corporation plc 
(NYSE:GTES) 
3.033,74 408,62 290,97 2.820,0 2262 413,5 253,3 3796,5 
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02/28/2011 SBO Independent Media 
Distribution 
Limited 
10,14 2,84 2,16 8,2 21 5,4 1,4 34 
04/20/2011 SBO Ideal Shopping 
Direct Limited 
117,3 8,74 6,98 47,89 149 11,9 9,6 77,4 
12/09/2011 Sold WorkPlace Systems 
International plc 
9,74 0,453 0,384 7,09 11 2,7 -3,6 10,8 
12/19/2011 Distressed Style Group Brands 
Limited 
118,3 5,98 4,51 57,45 158 -1,8 -8 90,7 
09/16/2015 IPO Alkane Energy 
Limited 
17,62 8,85 5,31 73,76 25,22 14,30 9,56 72,89 
           
  Mean 366,35 53,4 35,63 552,14 418,68 78,54 33,28 1.112,01 
  Median 122,61 20,34 13,15 182,75 151,5 25,0 9,65 247,6 
  Std. Dev. 601,41 91,97 67,44 1004,58 630,71 136,17 117,03 2068,49 
 
 
 
